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2
period

after World War II.

and especially

actually

only after the War that organized

entrenched

in the mass production

the trades,
capitalistic

and able to exercise

industries,

as well as in

its full rights in a free

of this field in our industrialized

and the intense

need for more knowledge

could not be more amply illustrated
that existed

labor was firmly

society.

The importance
society,

For it was

between

were an everyday

than by the turmoil

labor and management

This was a time in which
occurrence

about it,

in 1945 and

strikes and wildcat

and timely

agreements

strikes

somewhat

rare.
The theorizing
period

focused

tionship,
Derber,

and research

that began in this

mainly

on the local union-management

the reasons

for which are best expressed

relaby

et al:
"
a substantial majority of collective
bargaining agreements in the United States
are negotiated by local unions and local
plant managements.
Attention to the
local relationship has also been stimulated
by the strong emphasis on 'human relations'
in industry.
But most of all, this
interest has resulted from the widespread
belief that 'good' or 'constructive' or
'harmonious' relations at the plant level
are impor~ant to the s~rviva~ and ~rowth of
a productlve, democratlc sOClety."

1Milton Derber, W. Ellison Chalmers, and Ross
Stagner, The Local Union-Management Relationship, Institute
of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois
(Urbana, 1960), p. 1.

3
The study of the local union-management
ship has generally
within

taken two courses.

the field have stressed

local relationship

a source

of possible

'insights'

exercise

of a practical

uniformities

and suggestions

?

art."-

in the

On the other hand, acade-

and making

For the academicians,

the formation
theoretical

comparisons

among cate-

the objective

has been

of an "organi zed body of knovvledge with a

framework

Most

and generalizable

of the writing

union-management

and research

relationship

the conditions
peace.

However,

developed,

certain definitions

cover a majority

This alone turned

2Ibid.,

JIbid.

hIbid.

on the local

before

with

for, or conducive

to,

this topic could be

had to be set forth which

of the many different

out to be a difficult

p. 2.

conclusions.,,4

has been concerned

necessary

industrial

would

"as a study of 'cases',

value the field of study "as a basis for dis-

gories.,,3

defining

of the

and have thus valued the study of
relationship

covering

Practitioners

the uniqueness

the union-management

micians

relation-

task.

situations.
For example,

how does one define
Association

industrial

Committee

peace?

defines

The National

industrial

Planning

peace as:

"The product of the relationship be t.ween two
organized groups - industrial management and
organized labor - in wh i ch both coexist , with
each retaining its institutional sovereignity,
working together in reasonable harmony ip a
climate of mutual trust and confidence.")
Lester
ment to agree
the parties

and Robie attempted
on a criteria

for industrial

did offer a number

come to such an agreement.

to get union and managepeace.

While

of tests, they could not

The authors

did, however

extend this proposal:
"Certainly one of the tests of successful labor
relations is the ability of the parties to resolve serious issues and conflicts o~ interest
without resort to economic \!varfare."o
One common thread
definitions,

however,

or indirectly,

is the reference,

to the sanctions
In today's

of disagreement.
would refer almost
negotiations,

that runs through

industrial

exclusively

since arbitration

lized procedure

for settling

resorted

almost all

either directly
to in the case
relations,

to disagreement

in contract

has become a highly

disputes

between

this

forma-

contract

t:

JClinton S. Golden and Virginia D. Parker (eds.),
Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bar "ainin:,
New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1955.
Based on a project
sponsored by the National Planning Association.
6Richard A. Lester and Edward A. Robie, Construct4ve
Labor Relations:
Experience in Four Firms, Industrial
Relations Section, Princeton University, 1948.
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negotiations.
stressed

The fact that such sanctions

in defining

industrial

ing when one considers
beyond

peace is not so surpris-

the effect these measures

the local relationship

by the national

have been

and the coverage

may have

given

them

mass news media.

There have been four general
the study of local union-management
or predict

their

outcome,

stoppage.

The most popular

with

isolating

factors

ment

of a harmonious

approach

that relationship.

to analyze

settlement

or work

has been concerned

which are pertinent

could be called a typological

used in

relationships

timely

i.e.,

relationship.

ships are categorized

approaches

to the achieve-

The second has been what

approach,

that is, relation-

in terms of the characteristics

The third approach

has focused

of

on examin1

I:

ing the dynamics
itself.

of the collective

The fourth,

and most general,

the local union-management
relationship

relationship

to and development

The purpose

First,

variables

tionship

researchers

determining

For example,

Walton

as a result

process

approach

in a larger

relationship

system.

and McKersie

to the study

has been two-

have tried to uncover

a particular

examines

in terms of its

behind the factor approach

of the local union-management
fold.

bargaining

those

type of relationship.

view an existing

rela-

of:

"(1) the technological market and power context
of the parties, (2) the basic personality dispositions of key individuals in the relationship,
(3) the social belief systems of these individuals,

:1
::
"

'

"

6
usually shared in some degree by their respective
organizations, and (4) the actual ~argaining
experience t.hat they have shared."
Given a certain type of relationship,
purpose

underlying

to isolate

relevant

of importance

atmosphere,

approach

techniques,
of pattern

for its own merits.

involves

characterizing

to "conflict"

in order to better understand
and the manner

The typology
by Derber,

individual

Quite

a number

of

the dynamics

of

in wh i.c
h the parties

of union-management

.§.!

In

ranging from "collusion"

to settle the issues and problems

of forty-one

settlements,

and, in other cases, it

along a continuum

formulated

misevaluation

has simply been an

relationships

interact

of the

to the study of the local

of relationships

followed

this approach

these relationships

are

has also been attempted.

of some other approach

has been an approach
simply,

pressure

relationship

some cases a typology
outgrowth

settlement

etc.

The typological
union-management

past administration

of bargaining

of issues,

has been

Some of the following

of such factors:

poor usage

community

to the conflict-free

or disagreements.

illustrative
contract,

the use of the factor approach

factors

of disputes

the second

relationships

al, was developed

union-management

7Richard E. Walton and Robert B.
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,
Hill Book Company, 1965,)P· 190.

before them.

from a study

relationships.

McKersie, A
(New York:-McGraw-

I

7
As a result

of examining

these relationships,

the authors

came up with five major types of relationships
as:

characterized
"moderate

"aggression

collective

"repressed

of examining

bargaining

is primarily

to negotiations
the collective
techniques,

process,

to illuminate

a better

hostility",

all the factors

understanding

bargaining

tactics,

the dynamics

many of the pitfalls
Specifically,

communications,

(both internal

on its role in the bargaining
model

and external)
has

and elaborate

of bargaining

this model.

the model developed

haps one of the most
actual

on

or to set up a

and treat all of the facets

Of the many bargaining
posed,

process,

inherent

on bargaining

The approach

etc.

so that

writings

process have focused

pressures

approach,

involved

either been to treat each facet individually

within

and

of the

the third possible

can be avoided.

on the parties,

bargaining

"quiescence",

joint participation".

The purpose

through

and resistance",

jOint participation",

"extensive

which they

process.

distinguishable

structuring"

bargaining

that have been proand McKersie

and reflective

and McKersie

subprocesses,

in labor relations.
tive bargaining",

by Walton

comprehensive

Walton

that the collective

models

is perof the

begin with the premise

process

is composed

all of which are interrelated

They term these subprocesses

"integrative

of four

"distribu-

bar-ga ln i ngv , "attitudinal

and "intra-organizational

bargaining".

While
collective
most

the authors'

bargaining

significant

discussion

process

is quite comprehensive,

accomplishment

were able to tie in the results
the factor
description
Factors

approach

bargaining

were discussed

The last approach

lS

relationship

While

mentioned

mainly

to their

and the conof a typology

of these points to the

under attitudinal

to an understanding

of the union-

relations

in general

of the local relationship
to a larger

has not found many adherents,

because

structur-

bargaining.

in and relationship

this approach

i.e.,

process.

relationship

and industrial

that of a description

of its development

approach,

as well as a development

ing and intra-organizational

management

in whi.c
h they

of the bargaining

and the implications

process

their

of other approaches,

to the bargaining

duct of negotiations,
of relationships

is the manner

and the typological

of the dynamics

relevant

of each facet of the

in terms
system.
it is

of John T.

of the contribution

Dunlop.
In Dunlop's
an attempt

book, Industrial

is made to answer the follow~ng

(1) how is the industrial
society

a whole;

system related

relations

relations

system related

to the

relations

system; and (J) what are

of the inner structure
subsystem

Systems,

questions:

(2) how is the industrial

to the economic

the characteristics
dustrial

Relations

and the in-

9

itself.

9
T. Dunlop, Industrial
John
(New York:
Henry Hold and Company,

Relations

1958),

p.

System,

9
Dunlop
enumerating

goes about answering

the relevant

in the industrial
three

actors

parties

relations

by first

(which he calls "actors")

system.

are found within

"1.

these questions

He states the follow~ng

such a system:

A hierarchy of managers and their representatives in supervision
A hierarchy of workers (nonmanagerial) and
any spokesman, and
Specialized governmental agencies (and specialized private agencies created by the first
tW? actors) c~n?erned w~th w?rker~~ enterpr-a se s , and t.hei r- r-eLat.icnsh.ips ;"

2.
3.

There

are three important

ment which Dunlop

aspects

sees as affecting

of the environ-

the interation

of the

actors:

"(1) the technological characteristics of the
wor k place and work comrnunity, (2) the market or
budgetary constraints which impinge on the actors,
and (3) the 10cu~land distribution of power in the
larger society."
Dunlop

concludes

to guide the relationship

that the rules which are est ab Li shed
depend

the state of the industrial
society,

the power structure

and the relevance

It is useful
studies within

examination

,

system within the

of the actors

p.

11Ibid. , p.

relations

in the system,

in the environment

system is developing.

to note that the methodology
each approach

of samples

lOIbOd
___
l_.

relations

of one of the aspects

in which the industrial

most

on the state of the society,

7.
9.

used in

has been limited to the

of union-management

relationships

~

......c..-=---

10
within

a very limited

their

characteristics

terns

or consistencies

what factors

within

to industrial
bargaining

time span.

would then be compared

on why certain relationships

the various

a very practical

within

reason

over that of gathering

each relationship,

for the preference
data by examining

ships over much longer periods
of collecting

used,

attached
peace,

this one measure

local union-management

of determining

the following:

or timely

relationship

More

w~dely used, a
from

to the outcome,

l.e.,

of the negotiations?

Did the factors maintain

change

of union-management

year period, for the purpose

settlement

the same relative

from one negotiation

Did the character

of

of industrial

will be examined

What factorsitJere relevant

of importance
3.

of

of the importance

topic of this thesis.

relationship

over a seventeen

position

because

to the methodology

its inception,

2.

orientation

the subject matter

of the success

"in contrast

work stoppage

the local relation-

as a reflection

would be the principle

1.

There is

of this method

on the general

As stated earlier,

specifically,

etc.

of the

of time, and that is the

to develop

to work stoppages

relations

are important

and a very brief review of the methodology

it is now possible

this thesis.

develop,

data, and the time involved.

With this background
the literature

relationships

and

to find pat-

peace, wh at. are the characteristics

process

difficulty

These relationships

to another?

of the union-management

over time; and if so, did the changes

11
oc cur

»i s. thin

was there

the continuum

a relationship

in factors

relevant

In addition,
made as it reflects
Walton
tions

a general

aI , and

of the negotiations?

review

on the collective

will be examined
distributive

by Derber, ~

between that change and a change

to the outcome

and McKersie.

authors'

developed

Specifically,

of the data will be
bargaining

model

the individual

negotia-

with a view toward validating
and integrative

bargaining

of

the

models.

CHAPTER I
While

the major approaches

tive bargaining

were briefly

a more detailed

analysis

ation is necessary.
theoretical
cussed

Perhaps
examination
parties

the most appropriate

i.

e.,

bargaining
management,

from this process.

ly, what function

pOint,

of the literature

for the parties

the data to be dis-

place to begin an
is to look at what the
union, and worker,
different-

play in the industrial

involved.

In discussing

to examine the motivations

since there is a relationship

and the function

this
of

between motivation

served by the process.

In past years,
authorities

will set forth the

Stated somewhat

does this process

it is also necessary

the parties

under consider-

III.

involved,

organization

in the Introduction,

for considering

of collective

hope to achieve

reviewed

Such an examination

framework

in Chapter

to the study of collec-

and to some extent even to the present,

in the field thought

money motivated.
what union members

For example,

that workers were primarily

a study by K. M. Thompson

want concluded

that:

"Wages are the prime element influencing
employee satisfaction in unionized indust r-y .
He says that psychological rewards,
12

on

13
no matter how desirable, cannot serve as
I?
substitutes for collecti ve\j\Jageagreements." This philosophy
largely

of human motivation,

discounted

managers

alike.

however,

by present day psychologists

As Ross Stagner

has been
and

states:

"A second common error in the field of the
psychology of motivation as applied to industry may be called the 'dollar fallacy'.
According to this view ...
workers
are motiva~~d only by what is in the pay
envelope."
and:
"
. wages are not the most important motivator for persons in industry . . . ego motivation rather1than economic motivation is
predominant."
Perhaps
vation

a morevvidely

in today's

as being dictated

physiological

acceptance,

theory

world is that espoused

sees man's behavior
needs:

accepted

ego needs,

needs,

of human moti-

by Maslow.

by a hierachy

Maslow
of

safety needs, need for love and

and the need for self-actualization.

.
12Marvin D. Dunnette and Wayne K. Kirchner, Psychology Applied to Industry, (New York:
Meredith PubIlshing
Co~npany, 19(5),
r- 201, clting K. M. Thompson, "Human
Helations in Collective Bargaining," Harvard Business Review,
1953, Vol. 31, pp. 116-126.
131. L. Heckmann, Jr. and S. G. Huneryager, Human
Helat~ons in Mana~ement,
(Cinn., south-Western Publi~hi~g
Co., 1960), p. 15 , quoting Ross Stagner, "P sychologl cal
Aspects of Industrial Conflict:
II Motivation," Personnel
Psychology, Vol. 3, No.1,
(Spring 1950), pp. 1-15·
IhDunnette and Kirchner, .£E. cit., p. 201, quoting
Ross Stagner, "Psychological Asp~cts of Industrial Conflict:
II Motivation," Personnel Psychology, Vol. 3, No.1
(Spring
1950),

pp. 1-15·

lLr
Simply

stated,

at any point in time, the prime motivator

pends

on the need level on which the organism

Thus,

if man has fulfilled

shelter,

of Maslow's

bargaining

wh i.c
h offer to fulfill

list of demands.
that basically

satisfied

the purpose

depending

this differently,

the fulfillment

on the

those factors

we could say

bargaining

for the

of his most basic un-

needs.
as reflected

by the f'oILowing

since World War II in this field seems to be that,

for the most part, workers
of just meeting
shelter

of motivation

are operating,

of collective

The gene:cal consensus
Writers

achieved.

that need will be at the top of their

Expressing

is to achieve

theory

are simply this:

need level on which the wor-ker-s

worker

by those things which

to him and the things he has already

The implications
in collective

is operating.

his basic needs of nourishment,

etc., he will be motivated

offer security

de-

the physiological

and clothing

of economic

have progressed

needs of adequate

food,

and to a large degree the safety needs

and psychological

areas as having

beyond the pOint

greater

security.

motivational

They point to other

value.

J. D. Houser

states:
"What the worker wan t s is a minimum essential
of life, and the word is consideration--regard
for his simple dig~~ty as a man.
It is the
least he can aak
v

"

_)

15Heckmann and Huneryager, £E. c it . , p. 160, quoting
J. D. Houser, What People Want From Business.
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Heckman

and Runeryager

whatever

is needed

to maintain

In discussing
to a motive

point out that "workers

status at the time.,,16

reasons workers

that appears

want more of

strike, Marrow

points

to be a search for self-actualiza-

tion:
"It is the discontent of workers who want something different out of life, different for themselves and for their own kids.
The addi ti onal
money they demand is a symbol.
It is not a
demand for more of the same thing, but a demand
not consciously defined, for something different.,,17
r

Dunnette

and Kirchner

state:

"Wages do play an important role in collective
bargaining and usually are a primary issue in
negotiations.
At the same time, however, demands for increased wages may often reflect a
demand for status, prestige, and rec~§nition
instead of dollar and cents per se."
Based
that today's
monetary
within

on the preceeding,
worker

rewards

is motivated

it is reasonable

to conclude

by psychological

and

to the extent that they enhance his status

the groups with which he associates

and fulfills

his

need for ego satisfaction.
Having
achieve

thus identified

from the collective

bargaining

can now be made of the union's

161
~.,, .d
York:

p.

what the worker

interest

seeks to

process,

an analysis

in this process.

162~.

17Alfred J. Marrow, Making Management Human,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957), p. 36.
18Dunnette

and Kirchner, .£E. cit.,

r-

201.

(New
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Describing

the function

of collective

bargaining

unions

is not so difficult

theory

the union strives to obtain those things which wi Ll.

fulfill
basis

the workers'

proposition

since 1n

R. Dubin, in discussing

needs.

of union decisions

thissame

as that for the worker,

for

in collective

bargaining,

the

stated

in these words:

"It does seem c Laa r that un i ori officials proposing to remain in elective office for any
period of\.:,imevvill develop the habit of de~laring that their decl~ions are in the interest of 'the body'."
Unions
as a useful

also find the collective

means

of obtaining

or may not be in the interest
These

objectives

may include:

the union

itself;

ship; and

(3)

other objectives
of the workers

which may

and enhancing

the existing

union leader-

the company with its base of power.

It should be noted that at any particular
function

of the collective

bargaining

process

depends

The predominance

upon the existi~g

union operating

needs

circumstances.

under the threat

will see the collective
solidifying

of anyone

its position

time the

for the union

may vary accor-d i ng to wl.Lc h of the aforementioned
predominate.

process

they represent.

(1) preserving

(2) preserving

impressing

bargaining

objectives

or more objectives
For example,

of an organizational

bargaining

process

as much as a means

a
raid

as a means of
of meeting

the

of the workers.

19Robert Dubin, Workin' Union-Mana ement Relations:
The Sociology of Industrial Relations,
Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.:
Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1958), p. 117.
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The function
is very basically
policies
tions

are perceived

with overall

of those related

and of those related

parties'

contractual

ing.

The first

policies

policies

contractual

of policies

attempts

opera-

and

can be discussed

to the union-management

obligations,

goals that management

to efficient

corporate

to the parties'

the category

for management

those labor-management

as conducive

Such labor-management

Within

bargaining

that of prescribing

and consistent

goals.
terms

which

of collective

in

obligations,

relationship.

relating

to the

there are three primary

to gain in collective

of these goals concerns

ment and is quite aptly expressed

bargain-

the economic

settle-

by Beal and Wickersham:

"The employer's economic interest is best served
by that combination of wages, hours, and working
conditions which results in the ~Rwest possible
total unit costs of production.,,~J
The second

basic goal management

one of at least maintaining
power,

i.e.,

control

the operation.
by management

seeks to achieve

the existing

distribution

over and responsibility

Maximum

control

for the flexibility

and possible

sweeping

changes

conditions.

Dubin discusses

collective

pOII'Jer
st.ruct.ur-ein wh i cn the parties

of

is valued

it offers in making

in adapting

of

for elements

of the operation

lS

rapid

to changing market

bargaining

as a

vie for what. is regarded

20Edwin F. Beal and Edward D. Wickersham, The
Practice of Collective Bar 'ainin , (Homewood, 111.-:Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1903 , p. 374·

as an important

and necessary

share.

He states that:

"Distribution of power in power structl.1reS
seldom remain stable.
Some person or group
is generally striving to control more important functions, or control their present one
more exclusively.
This is resisted by present
J?~wer hold~rs, who must give up 2~me power
If the strlvers are successful."
The third primary
out of negotiations
company

goal management

is a settlement

which will allow the

to run in an orderly manner.

characteristics

of management's

hopes to obtain

Dubin

sees three

concept of order:

"
(A) continuity with its past, (B) controlled amount and di~ecti?n"of ?hange in the
2?
present, and (C) predl ctablll ty a n the future.""~
This concept

of order could be illustrated

does not deeply
wage

structure

strikeable

alter basic procedures,
and/or policy,

by a contract

methods

of operation,

etc., and does not allow

issues during the term of the contract.

to say, a philosophy

that

of anti-unionism

That lS

could be tempered

at a

time when a strike would be especially

harmful

aspects

sees the following

of the business.

relationship

Bevars Mabry

in the determination

to other

of management's

approach

to labor relations:
"The approach to labor relcl.tionsby management
depends in part on the ideological value structure of management and its view of the union as
a threat to this structure, the economic conditions of the company and the industry, the
nature of union leadership, and the amount of
experience that management has acquired in

21D UOln, ~.
1

"

22I._.bl"d. ,

cit., pp. lL:.2-h3.

p.,~ ?03 .
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.

dealing

with a particular

Those management
management

relationship

management

philosophy

Depending
vailing

and the prevailing

on the existing

(1) limiting

poses as:
prestige

of the union;

company's

(2) completely

towards

management

process,

for such pur-

and thus the

undermining

of the union;

the union;

(4) winning the

(5) impressing employees with the

and (6) changing various union attitudes
and/or

collective

bargaining.

As in the case with unions, which policies
dominate,

as best serving the interest

very possibly
on management's
Having
to the parties
mechanics

perception
considered
involved,

to another,

of the total existing
the meaning

Such a discussion

in which the union establishes

mands

its goals or objectives.

by categorizing

depending

bargaining

topic concerns

start with the manner
and the company

will

situation.

of collective

the next relevant

of actual negotiations.

will pre-

of management,

shift from one negotiation

can best be treated

of

and the pre-

bargaining

the effectiveness

of the union;

goodwill;

C)

J./

circumstances.

could be functional

(3) enhancing the reputation
cooperation

a product

philosophy

the collective

to authorities,

2

related to the union-

are most typically

circumstances,

according

policies

.

labor organlzatlon."

should
its de-

This subject

these demands

and goals

23Bevars D. Mabry, Labor Relations and Collective
Bargaining,
(New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1966),
p.

97·

the
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(1) those relating

into three groupS:
cedural
(3)

changes;

to language

(2) those covering the economic

those relating

to the parties'

relationship

or pro-

issues;

and

as discussed

previously.
Because
or language
Walton

changes relating

can be readily

and McKersie

tegrative

of mutual

satisfactory
bargaining

formulated

Within

to be possible,

consideration

as joint problems,

this bargaining

concern are discussed

to both parties

as necessary

procedures

see them as suited primarily

bargaining".

problems

to contractual

mutual

agreement

at.

Walton

more

For integrative

and McKersie

in identifying

of all alternative

approach,

and solutions

are arrived

however,

to "in-

solutions

see

the problem,

and their con-

,

sequences,

and a preference

ing a course
effectiveness

of action.24

ordering

The authors

of the integrative

presence

of the following

states:

motivation,

of solutions

also state that the

process depends

psychological

and select-

on the

and informational

a free flow of information,

trust,

and

?c:

a supportive

climate.-?

In considering
changes

are desired,

following

which areas language

the parties generally

or procedural
look to the

criteria:
(1) past administration

21
~ "Walton and McKersie,
25Ibid.

of the contract

.2£.

0·,

p.

137·

provisions;

1,1
I
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(2) provisions
grievance

most often questioned

through the

procedure;
(3)

existing

aspects

contract,

of the relationship

but put into question;

(4) provisions
procedure

arbitrated

and establishing

unsatisfactory

concerned.

the value involved

an aspect

of the relationship

critical,

its value as a trading

Typically,

through the grievance

in this area can have a twofold

i. e.,

parties,

and

an interpretation

to one or all of the parties
Issues

not covered by the

however,

value for the

in clarifying

or changing

and, if the issue is not too
item for some monetary

as the parties'

issues become

fewer in number,

occur.

for evaluative

relationship

gain.

ages, these

but more critical when they do

,I

identify

Thus,

critical

purposes,

it becomes

easier to

II
I

,

issues in this area as the relationship

matures.
vVhile procedural
their importance
economic

issues

depending

goals evolve

in v~ich the union's

talking

demands

analysis will be made

demands

and the company's

at this point in discussing

and the company's

about their actual demands

admit to themselves.

status.

issues.

It should be emphasized
the union's

in

situation,

retain a high priority

a more detailed

into economic

issues vary widely

upon the particular

consistently

It is for this reason
of the manner

and language

Walton

goals, that we are

and goals, the ones they

and McKersie

refer to such goals

i

22
and demands

as "targets".

a union would vigorously
throughout
increase

negotiations
is actually

of this concept,

seek a 15¢ per hour wage increase
knowing full well that a lO¢ per hour

what it hopes to finally

The criteria
justifying

As an illustration

generally

the parties'

achieve.

used for establishing

positions

and

are well enumerated

by

Torff:
" 1.

2.

3.
4·
5·
6.

7·

ability to pay
cost of living
minimum family budgets
productivity
maintenance and increase of purchasing
areas or industry rate com@~risions
pattern wage adjustments."

All of these

criteria

establishing

its position.

will

a party's

support

criteria

within

targets

maximum

settlement

points

in that

At the same time the

to some degree, minimum
Again

pOints".

point to note, when discussing
and resistance

and

the

points, that

could be used to support either party's

at different

For example,

expectations

are also established.

used in setting targets

each of the criteria

ship.

while other

refer to these as "resistance

An interesting

position

in one direction

limits.

are established,

and McKersie

criteria

There are those criteria which

position

realistic

party's

Walton

are called into play by each party in

will act to keep the party's

direction

power

times during the lifetime

during periods

of economic

of the relationgrowth and in-

(Neill!
York:
26c'oe I vvyn
McGraw-Hill Book
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flation,
justify

unions

could use the cost-of-living

a large wage increase.

deflation,

unions

ing to justify
stating

would

However

obviously

an increase.

criterion

to

during periods

of

not point to cost-of-liv-

Torff expounds

on this point in

that:
"
the approach of both unions and employers
to the above listed criteria is fundamentally
opportunistic.
Whichever criteria support a
bargaining party's position at any given time ar~'7
invoked; the rest are glossed over or rejected."

To summarize,
gaining

vve have said that the parties

involved

make use of all the above cited criteria

ing their targets
negotiations
criteria

and resistance

have begun,

which

points.

the parties

in bar-

in establish-

However,

once the

will only invoke those

support their positions,

making the assump-

tion that the other party will invoke those criteria wh i.c
h
support

his position
Before

leaving

party's

targets

discuss

how Walton

Referring

positions
point

and McKersie

points,

it is necessary

in negotiations,

relationship

to

and McKersie

of the parties'

that is, the upper resistance

overlaping

pOint to form a positive

of a

see their interrelationship.

I (see page 24), Walton

A as the typical

of the company

the other party's position.

this topic of the establishment

and resistance

to Exhibit

see Example

and deflate

the union's

"settlement

range".

then of negotiations

is to bring opponents'

outer most extremity

of this range.

lower resistance
The purpose
positions

to the

EXHIBIT I
EXAMPLE
UNION RESISTANCE

\POINT

(A)

.

POSITIVE

SETTLEJVJENT

RANGE

,r==>:
-"""
'
't,/ /

°
------CO-M-j-i

-

7

U

~

TARGET
NION

xDollars

COflJP ANY\ H~SIS'l'ANCE

-

A N Y

TARGET

POINT

EXAMPLE

(B)

m
JUOI/TARGET
o

COMPANY~

NEGATIVE
SETTLEMENT

~.._----\
...

COMPANY

RESISTANCE
POINT

RANGE
j_--I-----XDOllars

UNION

RESISTANCE
POINT
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While Example
situation

in negotiations

lS a situation

which

In power bargaining,
a settlement

is no overlap
ment range

as seen by Walton

that is, strike, lockout,
This situation

position(s)

or rather a negative

cite Albert

settlement

Rees'

result

arises where either
that there

points and thus no settle-

settlement

range.

range can occur, Walton

study on the relationship

tendency

it

etc., before

is so unrealistic

in their resistance

how a negative

and McKersie,

could arise and quite possibly

is reached.

one or both parties'

I is not the typical

B in Exhibit

To exemplify
and McKersie

of the business

for the parties to develop

incompatible

cycle to the

.
(reslstance

expectations
relates

.
2g
pOlnts).

Rees' conclusion,

as it

to the vvalton-McKersie model, was that a "negative

settlement

range'

peak business

is most likely to occur just prior to the

activity.

The conclusion

of this subject on the establishment

of the parties'

positions

to a discussion

of the manner,

the parties

the "strategies"

leads

and "tactics"

use in order to bring about the final compromise

settlement.
While
strategies

and their interrelationship

a discussion

of the many different

would be interesting,

Of much more importance
role of strategy

of

it would also be superfluous.

is a discussion

in collective

types

on the purpose

bargaining.

or

,.
,I
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In discussing
bargaining,
procedure

we are basically
which the parties

probability
cally,

strategy

for attainment

it is a prescribed

and influencing

as it relates to collective

talking

about that method

see as providing
of their goals.

the highest
More specifi-

course of action for evaluating

the other party's true position,

ing the groundwork
of the party's

of

for an atmosphere

final position.

conducive

thus lay-

to acceptance

The implications

of this

(1) the parties do not openly reveal their
definition

are:

real goals

or demands,

reveal

and (2) since the parties do not

their real positions,

positions

he perceives

evaluating

each party must try to influence

as real.

the opponent's

Obviously

position

is to ascertain

how much must be contained

in a proposal

satisfactory

needs.

to opponent's

Dubin
an integral
evaluating

the importance

part of any strategy
each other's position

Specifically,
driving

acknowledges

the purpose

of

what and

in order to make it

of evaluation

as

in that he sees the parties
throughout

negotiations.

he sees three steps of evaluation

leading up to

the final bargain:
"The first step in any system of bargaining is
to know the issues at question.
Each party to the
potential bargain must know what he vlTant
s, what
the other party wants and is willing to offer,
and what the potential area of compromise between
every difference might be .
"The second stage in bar'gaining requires an appraisal
by each party of the differences betwBen expressed
demands and what will be finally accepted

I:
j',

27
"'The third stage in bargaining is one in which
secrecy and sl~ness is likely to be the dominant
motif.
A tremendous amount of time may be spent
at this state of bargaining, trying to develop
clues a~~ut the real intentions of the other
party." "
Walton

and McKersie

one in which the parties
expected

utility"

distinguish
process

lssues

attempt to determine

the real issues.

'The authors,

the opponent's

the "subjective

expected

process as

the "subjective

of the other party's demands

of influencing

altering

view this evaluating

and thereby

in turn, see the

position

utilities"

as one of

of the various

in order to bring them in line with the party's

position.
Walton

and McKersie

thus view a successful

as one which allows the parties to accomplish

strategy

the following:
i'

, {

"(1) to assess the opponent's utilities and strike

"

. to ascertain his resistance point.
costs . . to conceal or misrepresent the utilities
(2)
the party inherent in the agenda items.
for
. to modify the opponent's perceptions of
(3)
his own utilities.
(4) to manipulate 5ee strike costs of the party
and the opponent."
Tactics
a particular

should be construed

strategy.

as tools for carrying

'Thus various tactics

could be employed

to force opponent

to reveal his real position,

nent's

of actual strike costs, and to conceal

perception

own utilities.

29Dubin,

QE.

30 Ibid.,

p.

ill"
61.

pp. 15Le-56.

out

to alter oppoone's

Perhaps

the most, well known tactic is the union's

of the strike weapon.

As Beal and Wickersham

use

point out:

"Unless it sets a specific date and time, the
strike vote taken early in the negotiations is
almost al~ays a maneuver:
a mere thr~at,~~
psychologlcalvveapon,
a cold-war r.act i c .II)
The union's

use of this tactic is basically

of altering

the company's

thus a reevaluation
tactic

perception

of its strike cost and

of its resistance

to a strike threat

for the purpose

point.

A counter

is the threat that large inventories

have been compiled

and, if a strike ensues,

it will be a long

one.

tactic

can be especially

effective

a long strike.

The purpose

This counter

parties

previously

endured

such a tactic

exactly the same a
for the company is

strike threat

used by the union.

c
,~

Other tactics

if the
of

the

are those Inthe parties may employ

vol ving cornrni
ttment-non-c ommi ttment, bluff -non-bl"Llff,hostility,

and use of public

mittment-non-committment
related

sympathies.

The tactics

and bluff-non-bluff

of com-

are closely

in that the use of one almost always involves

of the other.

Stevens

illustrates

this relationship

the use
stating:

"One major problem confronted by the player of
notbluff is conveying to his opposite number the
truth regarding his intended course of action ....
In short, the player of notbluff may be in need of
some device whereby he may pledge or commit himself,
to the satisfaction of his opponent, to a course of

')1Beal and Wickersham,
)

2.E'

cit., p.

279.

II
(
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action wh i ch he intends to pursue."
The problem
device,

for the party in this situation

i.e., some management

ment will be convincing
The successful
difficult

1S

to find that

to which a committ-

to the opponent.
use of the bluff tactic

in that it involves

out giving

principle,

3?~

establishing

the cl_ppearanceof comrni
ttment.

use of the bluff tactic, Stevens

sees the

is more

credibility

with-

In d is cu ssi.rigthe

problem as one of:

"
. making a demand while at the same time
av oad Lng even the appearance of cOlmnittrnent-avoiding
'i?e1ng, deeme~ ~Y the op~lo/site
nurnb ezto have '~ssued an u Lt.amatum I."
..J

Stevens sees the
bluff

through

sentation

answer to establishing

indirect

modes

credibility

of a

especially that of misrepre-

of preferences.

f :';:'.
II:

Dubin

points

out the usefulness

of hostility

as a

I
(

i

tactic

in that it:

Ii:,
I"

"
may be used to jntimidate the other side
to disclose its position out of fear the hostility and threats might ingender.
.. Hostility
is functional in achieYing a bargain, and particularly in preparing the situation for mutual
compro~~se through revelation of real goals and
aims. ".J e
Again
sympathy

in turning

as a tactic

to Dubin, the usefulness

of public

can be seen:

32Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective
Ne~otiation,
(New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company,
19 3), p. 78.

33Ibid.,

r-

34Dubin,

.£E. cit., pp. 158-59.

93.

Bargaining

Inc.,

I::
il
"

!

i"

1
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"If it develops within the secrecy stage of
bargaining, that both parties become unwilling
to move rapidly toward revealing their true
intentions, the parties may turn to the public
in order to enlist their symp~thy ~~d thus to
apply pressure to the other Slde."
While the use of the aforementioned
integral

part of a successful

or under the wrong
be irreparable

tactics

strategy,

circumstances,

can be an

if used improperly

the damage

in terms of obtaining

could very well

a settlement

wi,

thout

the use of force.
One aspect

of collective

bargaining

been revie\i'Jed,
but which plays an important
psychological

phenomenon

the psychological
to a review

phenomenon,

Chalmers

role, is the

in the process.

this discussion

of the role of personality

cause Derber,
patterns

involved

which has not yet

and Stagner's

will be limited

and attitudes.

a discussion

Be-

study on relationship

is closely related to the above mentioned

gical factors,

As regards

psycholo-

of this study will be considered

last.
Perhaps
volved

the most apparent

in contract

of the negotiators.
has not advanced
conglomeration
successful
relations

negotiations

psychological

is the personality

While research

structure

in the area of personality

to the state of being able to prescribe

of personality

negotiations,

factors most conducive

authorities

p.

159·

that

to

in the field of labor

appear to have reached agreement

35Ibid.,

factor in-

on the following

31
f
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.actors:
1.

tions

the "intelligence"

of the complexities
2.

tively

set opinions,

3.

convince

situations

adjustment"

trust and confidence
the "salesmanship"

unhampered

by

obstacles

required

to communicate

and

of one's position;

and

to overcome minor, major and

to note in conclusion

these characteristics

it is the rare individual
these areas.

to obtain

in order to achieve one's goals.

It is important
possesses

necessary

of the opponent;

of the merits

the "determination"

frustrating

dividual

to forsee and deal effec-

and unusual

the "personal

the opponent

5.

in the process;

ethics, and rules of thumb;

the respect,

4.

involved

the "creativeness"

with changing

to absorb the full implica-

that every In-

to some degree,

who has developed

strengths

Thus to the degree that a negotiator

in all

is de-

ficient

in one or more of these areas, the more difficult

process

becomes

parties'

as a satisfactory

the

the

goalS.
The attitudes

tiating

means of meeting

but

process

that the parties bring into the nego-

may also play a determinative
Attitudes

effectiveness

role in the

relevant

to the

of this process.

36
Beal and Wickersham, .2.£. S·, p. 28~,; Sumner
See
H. Slichter, James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash, The
ImJact of Collective Bar ainin
on Mana ement, (Washington,
D.C., The Brookings Institution, 19 0 , p. 9; and Sara E.
Southall, Industry's Unfinished Business, (New York:
Harper
and Brothers,

1950), p. 42.

32
parties'

relationship

origins:

in the negotiating

those developed

years,

and those developed

ship.

This discussion

vance

of the parties'

during the parties'
during the tenure

attitudes

towards

out of the relationship,

attitudes

are more of a general

formative
of the relation-

will deal specifically

developed

into a discussion

process have two

with the rele-

each other as

since the other type

orientation

and fall better

of personality.

It should be noted at this point that, in discussing
the parties'

attitudes

towards

each other, the assumption

made that the type of relationship
reflection

of their attitudes.

tion to make,

criteria

This is a reasonable

use the parties'

for classifying
The first logical

such attitudes,

question

factors

to the collective

attitudes

as a

what factors

con-

Kerr and Siegel see external

bargaining

on the type of relationship

in that the parties

relationship

as setting

the parties may develop.

they add, such limitations

for variation

studies referred

to ask, ~len considering

is hoW do they develop,

to their formation?

However,

assump-

relationships.

tribute

limits

the parties have is a

since many of the typological

to in the Introduction

lS

usually allow enough room

are free to establish

a

.
h· 37
good or b a d re I atlons lp.

37Derber, Chalmers and Stagner, ~. ill.., p. 72,
quotirw Clark Kerr and Abraham J. Siegel, "Fundamentals of
Labor Peace, A Final Report, Case Study No. 1h", National
Planning Association, 1953, pp. 47-4g.

Dunnette

and Kirchner,

the above mentioned

of the parties'
presentatives,

to the results

in 1948, came to the general

study by Stagner
within

pointing

limits the major
i.e.,

attitudes,

was a feeling

conclusion

that

characteristic

union and management

of suspicion

of a

and distrust

retoward

38

one an ot he r .

Beal and Wickersham
attitude

characteristic

overall

experience

the authors

expand on this particular

by discussing

in the parties'

carne to the following

the influence

relationship.

of the

Briefly,

conclusion:

"The hi st.ory and experience of a given local
union and the labor relations policy and record of the company with which it deals have
much to do with the uni~~'s militancy, its
willingness to strike."
Keith Davis perhaps
problems

found the solution

created by suspicious

attitudes

ships in wha t he calls the "mirror
concludes

that management

the relationship
toward

developed

upon Stagner's

effect".

Basically

in that management's
collective

burden

on management's

having

this responsibility

Davis
for

attitude

bargaining

on the part of the union.

conclusions

"8
JDunnette

and pOOr relation-

bears the main responsibility

the other party and toward

the same attitudes

to the

breeds

Davis calls

in a 1955 article to place this

shoulders.

Stagner

saw management

for two reasons:

and Kirchner, QE.

39Beal and Wickersham, ~.

(1) manap'ernent
c::

cit., p.

cit.,

p.

as

193.

280.

34
is the dominate
and

party in the union-management

(2) management

has more to gain by improving

ship and its leaders

a more cooperative

the relation-

are more free to act than union officials.

If the above is accepted,

for management

relationship;

then in looking towards

attitude

and relationship,

to heed the following

creation

of

it would be well

recommendation

from the

Department of Labor:
"In the same American tradition both labor and
management must corne to a realization that both
can func~ion most effectively when each enjoys
(J
the confldence and has the consent of the other.,,4
Having
variables

thus considered

on the union-management

cally on collective
Derber,

the role of psychological

Chalmers,

bargaining,

and Stagner's

relationship

and specifi-

it is now possible

to discuss

study of relationship

';1
i'

,,'

patterns.

I ~/

1:1

il"
I,;

In review,
authors

it was mentioned

developed

ships ranging

from "aggression

and resistance"

The relationships

to "extensive

studied were cate-

vvithin this range on the basis of three variables:

(1) union influence in the union-management
taking

that these

from their study a continLHUYlof relation-

jointparticipation".
gorized

in the Introduction

into account the scope and variety

up in collective
the union;

bargaining

relationship,
of issues brought

and the depth of penetration

(2) the degree to which pressure

40partners In Production:
Committee of the Twentieth Centur
Nichols,
New York:
Twentieth Cen
p. 86.

by

tactics were used

,

I

"

,i
II ,I

",

",

I':
;1
I,'

'"

'I'

:.'
1,li
I':'

r:.".
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by the parties;

and (3) the attitudes

each other.
The characteristics
developed

of the parties toward

of the relationship

patterns

were as follows:

"(a) Aggression and resistance, reflecting high
union influence, unfavorable attitudes, an unfriendly emotional tone, high use of pressure,
high reliance on past practice and informality in
contract administration, slow grievance settlement and frequent inability to negotiate a new
agreement without the assistance of outside
mediators.
(b) Quiescence, reflecting low union influence,
absence of pressure, favora~le attitudes, friendly
emotional tone, and low rellance on past practice.
(c) Moderate joint participation, reflecting moderate union influence, absence of pressure, favorable
attitudes, friendly emotional tone, ability to
settle negotiations without assistance, rapid
grievance settlement, low reliance on past practice
and a willingneSs to make concessions to the other '
side.
Cd) Repressed hostility, reflecting moderate union
influence, an absence of pressure due to union weakness and inabi~ity to ser~ously challenge management,
and unstable, lnformal grleVance process based on
low understanding.
(e) Extensive joint participation, reflecting a
high union influence and favorable attitudes,
a considerable degree of initiative and give and
take by both sides without the use of pressure
although often requiring the assistance of mediators in contract negotiations, a high reliance
on past practice in grievance settlement but with
a willingneSs to make exceptio~s toLihe contract
and concessions to the other slde." I·
It should be noted that at any point in time a relationship
may not fit within

41Derber,

anyone

Chalmers,

of the clusters, but may be in a

and Stagner, Q£.

cit., p. Ill".
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transitional

stage between

relationships.

In this study, the authors also tried to find out
whether

there was a relationship

tudes toward

each other and the degree

the relationship.

The results

that management's
summation

attitude

of the degree

areas of interaction,
ment apparently
influence,

between

atti-

of satisfaction

of this analysis

with

indicated

toward the union is probably

of satisfaction

and the union's

was contingent

with grievance

the parties'

a

felt with the various

attitude

toward manage-

on satisfaction

with depth of

settlement,

and with contract

h2

negotiations.

Summarily,
to examine

in this chapter an attempt has been made

the literature

identifying

those factors that pre'.'

1.1

sumably

corne into play in the collective

bargaining

'I:!

process.
"

There

are several

other factors,

namely perception

and

i

I::

j:::,.,

I.

I,I!,

communications,

which have received

wide attention

in the

II

:i

labor relations

literature,

eluded primarily
conclusions

because

of these factors was not In-

the data was not adequate to allow

on the role of these factors within the relation-

ship under

study.

these theories

Prior to considering

and research

tions at the XYZ Company,
company's

but which have not been included

A treatment

in this review.

union-management

negotiations

findings

historical

h2Ibid.,

p.

87·

of

to the contract negotiafacts relevant

relationship

will be reviewed.

the applicability

to this

and its contract

I'"

:1

I::
,I

I'"

li:l:

CHAPTER II
In the preceding

review

and surnmarize

the dynamics

chapter an attempt was made to

research

on the present day theories

bargaining process-

of the collective

part~cular, Walton and McKersie's
tive bargaining

models,

and Derber, Chalmers

contLnuum of relationships
this process.
management

order to determine
appeared

In

and integra-

and Stagneria

as they relate to

in the Introduction, the union~

at one company will be examined

negotiations.

of that relationship

and in

In order to later recognize

those factors which played a major role in this shaping,
especially
necessary

in the collective

to

in

which factors cited by these authorities
in the shaping

relevant

the resulting

were discussed

As indicated

relationship

distributive

of

bargaining

review the historical

process,

development

and

it is first

of this com-

pany.
The lIZ CorporatiOn

1906 as an engineering

tial

heating

and

organization

air conditioning.

of the organization,
of ~U5,000

began its existence

and his

specializing

This company

after 'World War I when l't

with a capitalization

concept

continued

37

of horne heating.

as an engineering

purchBlsed

in residen-

Mr. H. Brown, the founder

began operations
own original

on April 6,

pat.snt

rights

firm until
on a

38
schoolroom

heating

and ventilating

unit from another firm.

At this point the XYZ Company moved into the school heating
market.

While there were great risks involved

the results
surpassed
profit

proved

very favorable.

a million

By

1925

and a quarter dollar

in this move,

the company had

sales volume with a

of over $350,000.
The company's

a line of industrial

move into this new product,
heaters

several years later, also had

one other very important

implication

the successful

of their new equipment,

Company

marketing

was forced into handling

it happened

on its operations.

With

the XYZ

its own manufacturing.

in the later Twenties

either built

as well as

Thus

that several plants were

or bought in order to handle this new phase of
-I

i"

ii;

the business.

I;'
II

I,'

I

When the Depression

hit, building

construction

to a halt and the XYZ Company was in Yleed of an additional
product
plant

to supplement

capacity.

again entered

the residential

During
depended
tion:

heating market.

the hard years of the Thirties

basically

schoolroom

air conditioning

on three products
unit ventilation

equipment,

until

presidency

1935 when he retired.

the company

to support the organiza-

equipment,

and industrial

]VIr.H. Brown had continued
company

the company

home heating

unit heaters.

on as president

of the

During Mr. Br own 's

the company had grown from a one-man organization

to a company that realized

a sales volume

of approximately

and

I:.r'I

','"'
: ~:- I

-.

11!,:i
1<1

;i

its sales volume and to fill its excess

Thus, in the early Thirties

i

came

II

i

I

!;!::
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one million

dollars

and several

new manufacturing

quality

products

unrepresented
developed
creased

a year plus new administrative
facilities,

by a union.

proportionately.

had inrelation-

by a company officer under Mr. Brown at

Upon the retirement

the two companies,

his son, Mr. R.

of the XYZ Corporation.

in this position

was purchased

in tone.

of Mr. H. Brown,

Br-own, took over as president

as Vice-President

of employees

The management-employee

that time as being "paternalistic"

Company

for

As the company had grown and

over the years, the number

continued

a reputation

and a work force that, as of that time, was

,ship was described

Brown

offices

Mr. R.

until 1950 when the XYZ

by another firm.

After the merger

Mr. R. Brown continued

on for several

in charge of the XYZ Division

of
year,s

of the parent

firm.

company

Soon after Mr. R. Brown took over as president,

the

and the labor-management

some

dramatic

changes.

relationship

The war in Europe,

underwent

especially

after the

entry of the United States, forced the company to search for
new product

markets,

brought

to a halt.

product

markets

confronted
a union,

construction

And then, as if this~search

wasn't

andvvith

to be the easier

was again
for new

enough to adjust to, the company was

with another new development,

namely the entry of

it a new course in labor-management

The company's

Branches

since civilian

search for new product markets

and more successful

of the military

services

relations.
proved

of the two adjustments.

of most of the countries

~ I

i'

hO
involved

in the war found a great need for some type of

portable

heat for men and material.

technical
heaters

background

climbed

upon the company's

and present capabilities,

for the military
As evidence

marketed.

Drawing

were successfully

of this success,

portable

designed

corporate

and

sales

to about two million dollars in 19h2, and by 194h, to

over four and a quarter million

dollars.

heaters

contracts to the Government

in the form of costplus

1I'Jere
the main
dustrial

contributor

unit heaters

These two products
of income

room ventilation

to this total volume , with in-

being about the only other contributor.

remained

throughout

Sales of portable

as the company's

largest

source

the Forties with the sale of school-

equipment

increasing

slowly in the latter

part of the decade.
The impact
into almost

of this abundant

every phase of the Company's

in some phases,

especially

facilities,

several

additions

were rented,

Some of these facilities
organization

on the company's
labor market

relationship,

In tenns of manufacturing

and new warehouses

were purchased.

were later to be the subject of union
negotiations.

of this business

employees.

The total wage bill increased

also had profound

effects

Many new people from a very tight

had to be brought

going from over $250,000

and was

were built on present plants,

and union-management

The impact

extended

operations

the union-management

to be felt for many years to come.

new plants

new business

in over a very short period.
substantially

in this period,

in 19h2 to as high as $650,000

in

-"~--'-

1944.

This increase

many hours
slight

of America

(Hereafter

exactly

on by the appearance

referred

Hadio,

of a union.

of the XYZ Company

on

the

found it necessary

employees

Workers

success-

and became

As

April 19, 1943.

there is conflicting

felt that the lIZ Company

and Machine

to as the U.E.F.E.)

representative

why the employees

representation,

rates, and

in the war y®a:rs was tQ the presence

the employees

their bargaining

.. --

of incentive

The United Electrical,

organized

_

earlier, the second major adjustment

had to make early

of a union.

fully

a loosening

in pay brought

As mentioned
company

--

was due to several things; neW employees,

of overtime,

increases

---.. - . ._-_._-.

to

to seek collective

testimony.

Mr. R. Brown

just fell prey to a heavy

organizational

drive that was going on throughout

at that time.

Mr. Brown added that, prior to the introduction

of a large union-organized

company to the area, union affilia43

tion had not been very popular.
Secretary-Treasurer
with the addition

the city

Mr . A. Smith, the company's

at that time, agreed with this reasoning,
that he felt the New Deal philosophy

time wa s influential

in making

of the

such organi zation drives

successful. L~L~
In discussing
representative;
different

who was a union official at the outset,

reasons

WBre cited for the employees

43Interview
Company,

this question with the present business

organizing.

with R. Brown, former president

of XYZ

April 1), 1969.
44Interview with A. Smith, former Secretary-Treasurer

of the XYZ Company,

on April 23, 1969.
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This official

One, employees

success.

were reluctant
centive
deal

cited three basic reasons

for fear of rate cutting.

and a certain

displayed,

social

Second,

there was a great

based on family relationships

club affiliation.

were low in comparison

And third, wages
larger employers

to those paid

These ernployerswere

the area .

only 60¢ per hour and

to turn in more than 80¢ per hour on the in-

of favoritism

in

all in the f'a r-m implement

LI,5

. d

In ustry.

In instances
determine
action,

were making

behind the union's

which

such as these, it is always difficult

occurred

or the reaction

first, an injustice
of the union pointing

justice,

real or imagined.

ever, it

W9.S

to

and then a reout the in-

After the issue was raised, how-

of only secondary

importance

whether

the inI

justice

was in fact real, since for the people

had become

involved

it

I
:

so.

There were several factors present

at the time of

'!

i··

the union's

arrival

on the scene which

this a most difficult
to.

relationship

The organizational

representative,

that time, described

contributed

to making

for the company to adjust

drive had been led by a union business

agent who was an acknowledged
business

I

Socialist.

The union's

who workedvvi th the organizer

him as

"Cl.

highly

present
at

skilled negotiator

and

45Interview with T. Maloney, business representative
of the International Association of Machinists, on April 2),
1968.

I
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r
nod ouo t a strlct
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Management,

1

that is, Mr. R.

I

Brown

and Mr. A. Smith, viewed the union as "militant,

aggressive,

not very cooperative,

line approach

and taking the old hard

to bargaining."

As both Mr. Brown and Mr. Smith pOinted
second major
to adjust

factor which made the union's

out, the

presence difficult

to was the fact that company representatives

completely

inexperienced

and uneducated

were

in union-management

relations

and negotiations.

Mr. Smith stated that the company

initially

took a "legalistic

approach to the union,

that a union

contract would be no different
This approach,

contract".
"a policy

than any other

as Mr. Smith indicated,

Significant

relationship

did not change to any

extent until Mr. R. Brown brought

as an assistant

sole purpose

to the president,

of handling

with an extensive

management

relations,

background

hard approach

in the field of unionthat was

Mr. R. Brown described

type of individual

him as

who seemed to enjoy the

to the tmion".

The next several years from 1946 through
to be years

for the

relationship.

brought with him an approach

more in line with the union'S.
"a rough, brusque

in Mr. B.

specifically

the union-management

Mr. Burns,

contract

represented

of containment".

The company's

Burns

feeling

of turmoil

strike lasting

for union-management

1949 ap

relations.

just over a month occurred

ared
A

in 1946,

followed
between
R.

by a twenty-six
these

Brown

contracts,

grievances

strike in

In addition

to the contracts

Mr. Burns also negotiated

1949.

were numerous

stated, 'were concerned with "trifling

the most part.

1948,

day contract

In

and, as Mr.

issues" for

in 1946 and

the labor contracts

in

1949

and again in 1950.
The contract

negotiations

while strike free, involved

in 1949 with the U.E.F.E.,

additional

were to have several recurrences.
(tool and die makers,
target

complexities

The toolroom

machinists,

Machinists,

I.A.M.).

District
On August

with the U.E.F.E.

Lodge 102 (hereafter

8,

employees

and apprentices)

of a unit raid by the International

were the

Association
referred

1949, after a contract

in July, the National

which

of

to as the

had been reached

Labor Relations

Board

~:;::

j.,

~

"

I

gave focmal

recognition

to the I.A.M. to represent

I

the tool-

II:i

room employees.
To recap the events of the Forties
tions,

we find the XYZ Company moving

market

with

future

markets.

flexibility
discipline
markets.

characteristics

required

with cost-plus

union-management

of cost-plus

from previous

contracts

The significant

versus the cost

in the other product

contracts

were to have a significant
relations

or

is meant the cost

to meet competition

This period

and their implica-

into a new product

far different

By "characteristics"

involved

they engendered

I

and the habits

impact on future

and negotiations.

increase

in sales during the Forties

ii

I,"j

!I I

/i

:i

I:>;

I

L'r5

also

the need

created

manufacturing

an Ixplnl1cn cf thi company's

rOT

facilities

And with the addition

and an expansion

of a militant union, the responsibility

relation~ W@l9 ~\(~g:reg6Ltsd for

of labor-management
ling by a specialist

futur'\lil
hand=

in the field.

If the Forties ushered
company's

of the labc~ £o~ce.

operations,

in dramatic

changes in the

the Fifties were no less hectic.

At

the outset the company was in the midst of trying to readjust
to the competition

of old product markets within the private

sector

of the economy,

handle

schoolroom

and to negotiate
treatment

ventilation

industry.

In terms of the merger's

purposes,

which involved

and which had the most far reaching

to obtain government

unit ventilation
source

took place.

was the change in product emphasis.

continued

of income.

since, for all

other than the XYZ's status

the change in conditions

most adjustment,
tions,

no changes,

to be overcome

effect on operations,

amount of adjustment

corporation,

Perhaps

to

as the major product,

One of the first hurdles

there was a negligible

as a separate

equipment

facilities

a merger into another company in the air

was the merger.

practical

gear its manufacturing

implica-

While the company

contract work, the sale of

equipment was again becoming
Competition

the

the major

being what it was at that time,

the company was forced to become far more cost conscious.
cost consciousness
In terms

its present
expenses,

meant evaluatin~

c>

of manufacturing,
equipment,

its methods and processes,

and the productivity

resulting

overhead

from its incentive

system.

Needless

of this program,
system,

to say, many of the changes that came out
especially

those relating

to the incentive

were met with some union resistance.
While Mr. Burns continued wi.t h the company, his

responsibilities

changed to become head of manufacturing.

With this change in Mr. Burns' position,
brought
Doud

Mr. F. Doud was

in to set up an Industrial Relations

Mr.

Department.

came on the scene just prior to the 1952 contract

negotiations

which involved

control measures
through

a conf'r-orrt at.Lon

which directJy

effected

on those cost

the employees

and,

them, the union.
The company's

re su L t of te st sand

psychological

consulting

agency,

as a

intervievJs, de scri bed Mr , F. Doud as "a
t,

highly

intelligent

man who had the personality

st.r-uct ur-e of

f

i

i

I
I
I

a very forceful,

aggressive,

dynamic individual".

However,

I

I

,1

111

the agency went on to state that:

I" I
,'.

"
. since he is an aggressive, independent
man and does not possess a strong natural
awareness of the interests, needs, and wants
of those around him, to some persons he may
appear to be s~~ewhat cool, indifferent
or
tempermental. ,,-+
'
The union business
Doud commented

representative

that deal t w.it.hMr. F'.

that:

"Mr. Doud carne from the J.

I. Case Company
which always has been anti-union . . . and
that it took severat8years before the nnjm,
could re lyon him."
r

47Final Report to person~el Department, XYZ Company,
by the ABC Consulting Agency, Chlcago, dated October 3,
1958 (in the files of the Department).
L,,8Maloneyintervievv, .9J2..

cit.

I

i'

I:,
! ;~:I 1
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An evaluation

on Mr. Do~s

effect

on union-management

negotiations

will be hanled later in this paper wheri

negotiations

in which

1949,

As in
became

rights

Finally,
'dithout

g,

on August

152,

a two year

Board dcided

was extened

to win bar-

contract

was settled

of that year the National

against

men from th production

contract

with the U.E.F.E.

men and their helpers.

a strike and inSeptember

maintenance

1,

.952 negotiations

for the nintenance

Labor Relations

this

the

will be discussed.

by anther I.A.M. petition

complicated

gaining

heparticipated

splitting

unit.

off the

19, 1953,

On June

one year, thus to expire

on June

1955.
19,1954,

On February
attempt

to expand

to represent

products

the hrgaining

the produ~ion

of the plants

and maintenance

acquired during

Board,

the Forties

bargaining

i~erest

representative

until June,

vITasthreatened

election

a petition

employees

The National

to appoint

at one

Labor

election,

declared

the U.E.F.E.

as the

and the plant remained

non-union

1955·

Again in ApriJ,

the National

its first

to manufacture

as a 'esult of a consent

there was notenough

made

unit by filing

under governrwnt contracts.

Relations

On May

the U.E.F.E.

1955

the U.E.F.E.'s

when tIe United

Automobile

Labor Re~ations Board

covering

25, 1955,

the production

bargaining

Workers

status

petitioned

for a representation

and maintenance

the ~ational Labor Relations

employees.

Board again

the D.E.F.E.

certified

as the rightful bargaining
In commenting

tl'lJ~of' th e emp~oyees.
l

representa-

on this election, ]VIr.

c:;

Maloney

pointed

Local regarding

out there was considerable

turmoil in the

the D.E.F.E.'s

with the AF of L -

affiliation

CIO and that the Local had decided against
the United

Automobile

Immediately
election,

with

Workers.

following

the above representation

the company and union entered contract negotiations.

This contract

negotiation

D.E.F.E. 's bargaining
evidence

affiliation

was somewhat unusual

in that the

unit was extended upon their showing

of interest by the employees at two plants and a

warehouse

acquired

this contract

during the late Forties.

Agreement

on

on June 2$, 1955, again, without

was reached

a

strike.
It was during the mid-Fifties
comrnittee was investigating
various

illegal

filtration.

activities

The D.E.F.E.

suspicion

of Communist

According

to Mr. Maloney,

unions to validate

was one of the unions under

infiltration

and possible domination.

the company's Local of the U.E.F.E.

Finally on December

Local voted to switch its affiliation

necessary

that, if they did not

with the AF of L - CIO, the Local would withdraw

from the International.

D.E.F.E.

claims of

and of possible Cormnunist in-

had given notice to the International
affiliate

that a Senate sub-

1, 1955 the

to the I.A.M.

The

contract was kept in tact after this except for the
changes

in identification

of the parties to the

49
contract.
Just prior to entering
1957, there was another
Nichols

was employed

tions function

contract negotiations

change made in management.

Mr. D.

to take over the local industrial

under the direction

Mr. Nichols

the same previously

psychological

mentioned

rela-

of Mr. Doud who had

moved into another position.

agency

in

was described

by

consulting

as:
"Above average intelligence.
. quite
sensitive and lacking in self-confidence.
He tends to compensate for this feeling by
being more aggressive in his interpersonal
relationships.
However, he is quite sensitive to criticism, rebuffs, and situations
which he feels represents failure.
We would
expect his lack of self-confidence to handicap him in his deal~~gs with others in the
organi zati on . . ." r
This evaluation

confidence

was also referred

with Mr. Nichols.
a very unstable
Position".

who dealt

It was also his opinion that "Mr. Nichols
respect due to his inability

and commit himself

Relations

terminated

to by Mr. Maloney

It was his opinion that Mr. Nichols

While Mr. Nichols
dustrial

lack of self-

"was

man who would not commit himself to any

hold the employees'
decisions

of Mr. Nichols'

did not

to make

one vray or another".

continued

in the position

Manager through the Fifties,

in the early 1960's.

of In-

he was

As one of the company's

49Final Report to person~el Department, XYZ Company,
by_the ABC Consulting Agency, Chlcago, dated October 21,
1959 (in the files of the Department).
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stated, Mr. Nichols was bas~cally terminated

vice presidents

becclUse of a deteriorating
to affect

his judgment

industrial

relation

employees

the negotiations,
center

products

manufactured

products

during the Forties.

situation

wh i ch presented

reorganized

Just prior to
along profit

split the defense work from the other

wise, and management
defense

unit by adding the

for the negotiations.

the corporation

lines which

This contract

which took place in 1959 we r-e

complicating

backdrop

The strike was

only nine days.

small plant acquired

negotiations

by another

an interesting

lasting

the size of the bargaining

Contract
preceded

of 1957 with the I.A.M. led

first strike since 1945.

at another

inappropriate. 50

were completely

negotiations

short lived, however,
again increased

to the point that responses to normal

problems

The contract
to the company's

physical disabil:_ty which appeared

by the XYZ Division.
w.i

Thus while profit

se , the three plants manufacturing

were independent

the plants were included

of the XYZ Division,

in the same union

two of

contract with the

XYZ Division.
In order to make the defense
dependent

of the XYZ Division,

necessary

to split the bargaining

two defense
Division.

product
Agreement

group

completely

in-

the company thought it
unit, i.e.,

split the

plants from the rest of the XYZ
with the union on how this would

50Interview with H. Stevens,
XYZ Division, April 1, 1969.

former Manager

of the

51
transpire

was reached

contract

negotiations.

the present
plants,

a majority

unorganized
contract

The basis of the agreement

plant.

of the employees

1960, the decade

in the third previously

will be considered

was settled without

Reviewing

later, but let it

covering the XYZ Division

a strike.

the course of events from roughly
opens with the undramatic

merger

into another firm in the air treatment

A more dramatic

adjustment

almost coincident

was that of reverting

to a peacetime

markets

by severe competition.

characterized

time an industrial
filled

that they re-

The impact of this change on the 1959

negotiations

employees

was that

would be adopted for the three defense

to say that the contract

company

1959, six months prior to

if the union could present evidence

presented

suffice

contract

in January,

relations

1950 to

of the

industry.

with this merger

economy and product
Also during this

function was established

by several men with almost conflicting

and

personalities.

The 1950's was also a period in which the union was undergoing
a great deal of change and assault by rival unions for the
right to represent

the company's

foregoing

the company continued to grow with sales

climbing
million

changes,

from about five million dollars
dollars

influencing

relationship

Amidst all of the

in 1950 to over eleven

in 1960.

In conclusion,
elements

employees.

in this part the major historical

the company's labor-union-management

and negotiations

were considered.

While this
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history

is far from complete,

the development
Exactly

made.

of the topic of this thesis

how each of these events affected

contract
cussed

those areas which pertained

negotiations

in Chapter

to

were discussed.

each of the several

was not treated here, but will be dis-

III as an analysis

of each contract

is

CHAPTER III

The discussion of
provides

the background

collective
ground,

bargaining

dynamics of the

process transpired.

With this back-

to examine the contract

that took place at the XYZ Company

over approxi-

a twenty year period, with a view toward examining

the applicability
Chapter

in which the

it will now be possible

negotiations
mately

the history of the XYZ Company

or felavancy

of the theories

discussed

I.
The general

approach to be followed

in this dis-

cussion will be to examine each contract negotiation
divid1J.allyin order to determine which factors,
thought

in

to be relevant

in shaping
tractual

by the theorists,

the settlement

in-

among those

played a major role

of the contract.

Only major con-

changes will be referred to in this chapter; however,

the complete
in appendices

list of negotiated
beginning

1943

contract

on page

Contract Negotiations*

After the United Electrical,
of America

changes may be found

was recognized

Radio and Machine

as the legal representative

Workers
of the

*A detailed list of negotiated changes was not
Possible due to the lack of information on negotiable items
prior to unionization.
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5LJ-

XYZ Company's
entered

employees

on April 19, 1943, the parties

into their first contract negotiation.

negotiation

was finally

settled on July 29, 1943 without

the n.ecess i.ty of a strike.
gredients

typically

circumstances
settlement

possible.

While
development

The specific influences

of the parties'
was available

applicability

of Walton

dicated

aspects

lack of data on the

positions during this negotiations
to permit some conclusions

and McKersie's

distributive

on the

and in-

The available evidence in-

models.

that had the country not been at war, a "negative

settlement
tions,

on by

have been considered.

there was a considerable

bargaining

brought

after the more disrupting

some evidence

tegrative

to a strike, there were special

on by the War which made the timely

the War will be discussed
of the negotiations

While there were many of the in-

conducive

brought

This first

range" would have existed throughout

and only if significant

movements

the negotia-

had been made on the

part of both parties would an agreement have been reached.
This conclusion

is reached as a result of considering

basis upon which the union's demands were formulated

the
and tho,se

upon which the company's goals were based.
Basically
tYpes _ monetary
Maloney,

the union's demands were of two general
and contractual

the union's

position

tated by two main factors:
Company's

existing

language.

As stated by Mr.

on the monetary

issue was dic-

(1) the discrepancy

between the

wage structure and that of other local

,
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employers

(primarily

who historically
the area),

companies in the farm implement

have been the highest paying employers

and (2) the unreliability

and a distrust

industry

of the incentive

in

system

of the manner in which it was applied.

The

fact that the union had stressed these points so strongly
during

the organizational

demands

and lessened

drive simply magnified

the union's flexibility

the remedial

in making

con-

cessions.
While the union would have found the above factors
as justification
demands

for considerable

from the company's

on monetary
benefit

viewpoint),

issues was influenced

levels

demands

(certainly excessive

the company's

position

far more by the wage and

in its industry and in the local area as a

whole than by the wage and benefit levels of the local farm
implement

companies

farm implement

alone.

companies,

level was relatively

While

the company's wage and benefit

and with overall local area averages.

it would not be necessary

that the resulting

goal,s and resi stance points result in a "negative
range",
based

the conclusion

settlement

that it would have in this case is

on the following:
1.

increased
jUstices
and

with the

high when compared with other companies

its ~wn industry

Within

Unlike the comparison

Excessive
awareness

pointed

union demands brought about by the

of the bargaining

unit to supposed

out by the union in its organizing

in-

drive;

2.

A conservative

management

servative

by the magnitude

socialist

leanings

0mlth
pointed
o
.
the

of the union's demands, the

of the union leadership,

and, as Mr. A.

out, the union's aggressiveness

management's

the wage issue and the manner in which

formulated

that throughout

coupled with

lack of experience with unions.

In discussing
the parties

made even more con-

their positions,

the history

it is noteworthy

of this union-management

ship the union used the wage and benefit programs
local farm implement
as justification
the programs

companies,

relation-

of the

organized by a rival union,

for its demands; VlJhereas,the company used

of its industry,

several of which were unionized,

and the local area as a whole to support its position.

It is

also noteworthy
tion reflects
the parties'

that this manner of goal and demand formula51
positively on Torff'. conclusion.
regarding

formulation

cluded that the various
are selected
selection

of positions.

Torff con-

criteria used in formulating

opportunisticallY,

positions

and that the opportunistic

tends to magnify the differences.

Of equal importance
resolved

Briefly,

to the union as an issue to be

was its demand for protective

contractual

language.

Mr. Maloney indicated of prime importance in this negotiation
was contract

language

1frhichwould so regulate

relationship

that there would be no opportunity

51see pages 22 and 23·

the day to day
for the

5'7
various

aspects
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of favoritism

to continue.

and lVIcKersiesee such demands
bargaining",

the conditions

for and conducive

as amenable

While Walton

to "integrative

those authors deem as necessary

to this type of bargaining

were not

present.
According
requirements
fication

to Walton

for integrative

of problem

identified,

"m ot"lvation"

"trust";

areas.

the authors,

the effectiveness

formation"

bargaining

state the following

the parties'

"supportive

The conclusion
agree on problem

is the mutual identi-

factors determine

of the problem solving process:

regarding

(h)

one of the first

Once the problems have been

to find a solution;

and

bargaing)

and McKersie,

(1) the

(2) a "free flow of inpreferences:

(3) mutual

climate".53

that the parties could not mutually

areas

(the first requirement

for integrative

is based on the following:

1.
bargaining

The company's

view that the union's newly won

status was based on factors external to the

employer-employee

relationship

in that relationship;

rather than on problems

with-

and thus
of the issues as presented

as

being a product

of the union itself and not a product

of

problems

the bargaining

2.

The perception

within

unit; and

52~See page 42.
53Walton

and McKersie, !2..£.

cit . , p.

13'7·

3.
tism,

The company's

the union's

was a fiction

belief that the charge of favori-

main argument for contractual

used in the organizational

language,

drive for its

t: i

emotLonal

appeal
Even

reach

agreement

on the identification
of the integrative

been minimal

re~ationshLp,
tion

votes.)+

if it had been possible for the parties to

ef£ectiveness
have

in drawing

of problems,

bargaining

the

process would

due to the obvious lack of trust in the

the reservations

to freely exchange

informa-

due to the lack of trust and the lack of a supportive
The basis for determining

clima-te.

these shortcomings

are

as f'ol Lows e
1.

The top management's

by its perception

cooperatlve
2.

approach

tainment".

56

3.

.

as indicated

company's

reluctance

by Mr. Smith's

to openly exchange
statement

to the union was basically

that the

one of "con-

The fact that the first two factors would cer-

not be conducive

supportive

C1_ggressive,and

,,55

The management's

information,

tainly

of the union as "militant,

.

not very

lack of trust as indicated

climate;

5LI- See page
r::_r

/)See

and

41.

page 43.

to management's

contributing

to a

59

4.

The fact that the union, in pressing the issues

as mentioned

in its organizational

and somewhat

hostile

bargaining
portive

feelings

drive,

among the bEl_rgainingunit and

cOHLmittee, which were hardly

climate

created negative

for integrative

conducive

bargaining.

It was thus due to the above conditions
integrative

bargaining

contractual

language

had various

wartime

be fair to conclude
acted to magnify
monetary

that true

was not possible and that the union's

demands

~ same manner
and in t.he

to a sup-

had to be negotiated

concurrently

as the wage and benef'it .i ssue~_g
s.

restrictions

A a In,
i

not been in ef'f'ect,it would

that this situation would have simply

the parties'

differences

especially

on the

issues.
While

the above data does not ref'lect on the

applicability

of Walton

gaining

as a means of settling

model

collective

bargaining,

the necessity
tegrative

and McKersie's

As implied

certain issues in

to be both possible

in the previous

and ef'f'ective.

discussions

diff'iculties in this negotiations,

relationship

the parties were developing

barrier

Derber,

et a L,

to settlement.
as "aggression

was high,

concerning
the type of

was itself a

The typology

ref'erred to by

and r-ea.is
t an ca" seems to be

the most ref'lective of this relationship
.i n f Lu en ce

on

to be present for in-

the parties'

further

bar-

it supports their conclusions

for certain conditions

bargaining

integrative

in that the union's

there existed v.nf'avorableattitude s , an

60
57
unfriendly
EVidence

emotional

tone and the high use of pressure.

of the presence

developing

relationship

of these characteristics

in the

were indicated primarily by the same

factors

which were cited for the failure of integrative

gaining

to be an actuality,58

experience

bar-

and the company's admitted

in-

in dealing with unions.

As was mentioned
the 19L ,3 negotiations,

at the outset of this discussion

there was one overriding

on

factor which

1

acted to neutralize

all other considerations

about a strike-free

settlement.

factor was not something
but was a special
The union,

strike policy
through

issue to reach serious proportions.

the integrative

of a hostile

bargaining

relationship.

3ee pages 58 and 59·

inability

to

con-

the ill effects

While the influences

3ee page 35·

range,

approach in settling

issues, and by neutralizing

57
58

for

These ex-

within a positive settlement

the ill effects of the parties'

language

on

made a settlement possible by keeping

positions

by neutralizing

policy

that it would have been quite difficult

restrictions

the parties'

tractual

insurance the government,

the War Labor Board, had such a restrictive

the monetary

utilize

brought about by the war.

level, had pledged itself to a no-

and as additional

wage increases

ternal

This one all-important

the local parties could control,

circumstance

on a national

in bringing

of wartime
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conditions

made this settlement possible,

it actually

only delayed

seen,

as will be

the day of reckoning

on the solution

of lssues.

1946 Contract Negotiations*
The parties were not as successful
at a settlement
finally

without a strike.

reached,

The absence

inhibited
goals.

Before agreement

of this strike.

by such artificial

played a major role in

The parties were finally un-

restrictions

in seeking their

There were, however several internal

factors,

which we re similar to those in 19~J, which directly
this strike.
Perhaps
existence

coercion

Walton

settlement

imposed by a work stoppage.
settlement

and McKersie's

range existed,

distributive

formulated,

,

to the economic

The basis for concluding
in support of

bargaining

extent to which the parties' expectations
were different

led to

range" which the parties

to resolve without resorting

that a negative

some of

the most obviouS factor was the continued

of a "negative

were unable

was

the parties had endured a 33 day strike.

of wartime restrictions

the occurrence

in 1946 in arriving

model, was the

(or positions)

the basis on which these positions

were

and the terms of the final settlement.

The basis for the union'S major monetary

*A detailed
in. Appe
A
nd i x A.

list of negotiated

demands

in

changes can be found
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this negotiations
settlements
rocketing

rested primarily

imposed

wage

on unsatisfactory

on it by wartime restrictions;

sky-

co.st of living which had taken its toll of previous

wage increases;

an excessive

amount o.f overtime for which

low, and in some cases, no premium rates

relatively

paid;

were

and the failure of the incentive system to generate extra
earnings;

which was of key importance

employees

in maintaining

the limitations

of the

their standarct 0[' 1ivins;. While

on wage increases

imposed by the wartime

restrictions

are self explanatory,

need further

clarification.

During

to a majority

the other three factors

the early part of the war years, the Wage

,Stabilization Board kept firm control on both wage.s and
prices.

These controls,

however,

later loosened

first in

the area of prices and sometime later In the area of

\OJ ages

.

By the time the freeze on wages began to loosen, wage levels
had fallen

appreciably

this situation

behind price increases.

was that, as union contracts

and negotiations

got underway,

dous wage increases

increases.

demands

both a

for previOUS
against

losses,

continuing

The

union's

time work resulted

of

began to expire

unions \oJere demand i.n« tremenb

in order to close this gap between

levels and price
included

The result

wage

At the XYZ Company the union's

substantial wage increase to make up

and a cost-of-living

clause as protection

price increase.
demands for increased
from the fact

that

premiums for over-

business had

increased

63
so rapidly

during the war years, and labor was so scarce

that extravagant
While

amounts

the earnings

leisure
usual

utilities
time.

of overtime had been scheduled.

which result from such overtime are

enj oyed by employees,
marginal

,

there is a point beyond which the

of extra money is not worth the loss of

As Mr. Maloney pointed out, it was not un-

for the employeeS during these years to have to work

seven day weeks.59

To remedy this situation the union
penalties

vo

demanded

increased

overtime

in the form of increased premiums for hours over

ten per day, Saturday,

on the company for schedulin

Sunday and holiday work as such.

The union's demands for improvements
system were the result of deficiencies

in the incentive

in this system re-

suIting

from factors beyond the employees'

company

got into several new product lines; customer-demand

required

many short run and special orders; and industrial

engineering

control.

The

was unable to keep up with these changes because

it could not supply incentive rates rapidly enough nor supply
well-studied

rates.

was that incentive

The resulting effect of these deficiencies
employees VIere spending increasing

of time on non_incentive

work and, when they did get incentive

Work, they had no guarantee that the incentive
generate

earnings

As a result,

amounts

correspondent

standard would

with the incentive

performance.

the union demanded incentive rates which would

59Maloney

interview, .£E'

.0..
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guarantee

an employee

a minimum of 120 per cent above base

rate when that employee
or when an incentive
f'

non-lncentive

performed at a normal incentive

pace

employee was assigned to specific types

work, an d' an lncrease d rate for incentive
r

O

employees

when vvorking on jobs where incentive

not available.
While the company's
recognition
its position
tempered
moment

standards we r-e

position was generally

one of

of the need for some rather substantial
relative

by various

changes,

to each of the above union demands was

operating uncertainties.

Recall for a

that during the war years the large influx of govern-

ment contracts
approximately

caused the company's business
$800,000

to grow from

in 1940 to almost $4,000,000

by 1946.

When the end of the war came, the XYZ Company had to look
back to private markets to fill a tremendous
cutback

in government

realized

that a substantial

to maintain

course

the company

increase was necessary

to new labor.

not only

This realization

to a level below union demands, however,

certainties
markets

Specifically

its present employeeS, but also to maintain

at a level attractive
tempered

contracts.

void left by the

associated

for a majority

wages

was

by the un-

with the company's returning

to private

of its business, and with the general

of the economy following the boom of the war years.

One thing the company was certain about, however,
the competition

was that

in the private markets was going to be more

severe than in government

contract work - typically

"cost-plus".

-

....-_

- -

--_._.
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The difference
markets
more

in the competition

characteristic

simply meant that the management

cost conscious.

include

of the two

would have to be

The company's position

also did not

a cost-of-li ving provision due to the rate atli'lhich

it had been rising and the potential cost obligations
provision

could mean if it continued to rise.

The company's position
overtime

such a

on the demand for increased

premiums was also tempered by future operational

problems.

The company's primary considerations

issue concerned

the uncertain

on this

demands of future business

as

well as the future labor supply.
The union's demands for certain guarantees
incentive

system were inimical to the company on the basis

of its potential

cost, and due to the effect of such guarantees

on the effectiveness

of an incentive system.

From a cost standpoint,
these guarantees
crease

under the

alone would have resulted

of approximatelY

assignments

increase

in an average in-

standards were not available

of approximately

and

20 cents per hour for

time spent on specifiC types of non-incentive
cost impact

on

10 cents per hour for time spent on

where incentive

an average

two of the union's demands

work.

While the

of these increases would have been minimal

incentive

employeeS

been spending a majority

lncentive

rated work, there are twO reasons to believe

had

of their time on
that

at most no more than 50~ of their available time was spent on
Until the late 1960's the company had a fairly
incentive.

....-.

--

--~--~--

//
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low incentive

coverage,

and the union was complaining

at

this time that there was a substantial lack of incentive
rates.
Because
the union's
a minimum

of the lack of data, the full cost impact of

demand

for incentive rates which would guarantee

of 120% earnings

could not be judged.

due to the fact that both management
tives

later acknowledged

rather

and union representa-

that incentive standards were

loose at this time, it would be fair to conclude

that this guarantee
for its initial
future

B

However,

was rejected by the company not so much

cost impact, but on the basis of potential

costs and on principle.
While the cost of these incentive guarantees

played

key role in the company's decision to reject thorn, of

equal importance
tions

in this rejectiOn was the potential

of these guarantees

Contive

system to generate

resulting
1.

on the effectiveness

of the in-

increased productivity.

effect on productivity

was possible

implica-

This

in two ways:

The effect of premium rates for specific types

of non-incentive

work, and work where rates we re not avail-

able, would provide increased motivation for employees to
seck this work in preference

to incentive rated work where

increased performance was required; and
2.
The misinterpretation of incentive
teeing
panding

rates guaran-

a certain level of earnings as a new bas. for exthe earning potential

of future rat •• without

a

67
corresponding

increase

in performance.

The fact that it was this wide disparity
parties'

positions

of the strike

solved;60

only after these issues were

initial

to Appendix B, the difference

hour wage

increase

provision

the

was the

for a 37 cents per

spread over a two year period).

tOlf1rhichthe company's position

wa

and (3)

s widely di-

from the union's initial demands.
The parties'

negotiations
support

betwBen

demands and the final settlement

of a cost-of-living

vergent

that

was quite close to its resistance

exclusion

the degree

re-

from the terms of the final

to the union's initial position,

position

(Referring

in that (1) a settle-

substantiated

was reached

relative

this initial

union's

further

(2) the indication

settlement,

point;

that contributed greatly to the Occurrence

WEtS

ment agreement

in the

relative

widely divergent
to the wage

to Rees' conclusion

the business
"incompatible

expectations".

eluded that such incompatible

the relationship

position

of

of the parties to develop

As previously
expectations

noted, Rees conare most likely

to occur prior to peak business activities.61
the company's

In those

issue also appears to lend

regarding

cycle to the tendency

positions

In this case

to a large extent was based upon a

fear that the bus Lne ss cycle would turn down, as indeed it

60Daily
61

Dispatch,

,see page 25·

May 21, 1946.
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did a f'ew months later.
reacting

The union, on the other hand, was

to a wartime boom and a period of rapid inflation

which had seriously

corroded previous wage increase.

Also worthy of note is the different criteria
(different as compared to the 19h3 negotiations)
the partie"

formulated their positions,

in this negotiations,

The union's demands

while to some degree influenced by

local wage compariSODS,

WBS

to a greater extent influenced

of inflation on vvages and inequities result-

by the effects

ing from problems peculiar to this organization.
pany'.

position,

its ~ge

by which

on the other hand, ~"

The com-

also influenced

by

comparisons, but more importantly by future busi-

ness uncertainties.

Quite obviously these facts, again,

Support Torff'. conclusion regarding the various criteria
the partie. us. in formulating their positions, but more importantly

they support his conclusion that the parties may

Use different
I

criteria at different times during the re-

L')

ationship.o(.,
In addition to the monetary issues, there were many

demand"

for changes in contractual langua"e which provided

anoiJ-r1ler'
opportunity
However,

f or t.he
,O'~ uc;e of "integrative

b:
..
e<rgalDlng",

for the same reasons thaX this type of bBr8aining

Was not possible in 1943, it waS again not possible in the.e
neeotlation ,
s

62 Torff,

The parties' relationship,

.£E.

0-.'

p.

~.~
..

characterized

a.
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aggression

"

and resistanCe"

in 191,3 became, H

hostile

(pr1mBrl-y
"
"1

years.

For the most part the company's perception

union

on thO unlon
e
" ," .'"d)

anything,

as an un~rrantod,

continued
stated,

unchang;ed.

As

of the

in hiS estimation,

forCE

the company spokesman,

these tim •• (the mid-Fortio.)

what were,

uXlng t h • interim
d"

unfriendly and threatening,

Mr. Brown,

more

wore characteci"ed

many petty grievancos

for the most part, lacked any merit.

by

which,

The fact that the union

was still viewed in this manner resulted In the company'.
continuing

it,s approach along the line of "containment"

"resistance".
From the cm~ents
union

of Mr. Maloney,

and

it appears that the

saw, in this approach, a lack of respect for, and re-

cognition

of, tho union as an entity.

As Mr. Maloney

stated,

it was this lack of respect for tho un~on, and an inability
to get 1.su • resolv.d botween contracts expeditiously that
e
lod to B great deal of aggression ~ong the .mploy •••.
It wac, thUS, the parties' rolationship,
terized
which

by attitude.

undermIned

of distD1.t,

again,

suspicion Bnd hostility,

t,tJe conditions necessary

to, the use of integrative

bargaining.

supportS Walton and MeKer"ie'.

conditions

charac-

for, and conducive

Certainly
conclusions

this evideDco,
that cortain

are necessary for integrative bargaining

both possible

and effective.

to be

The result of the parties'
q

In ~"
t"
bargaining was that all l"qs'le
a01lity to us. integra1Ve'
- • had to be negotiated by means of the distributive bargaining
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approach,

the effect

parties'

differences.

of which probably

The basis for such a conclusion

that, when these two categories
together,
values

tended to magnify

the parties

the

is

of issues are negotiated

tend to apply ill defined monetary

to the contractual

language

items

(integrative

topics)

which values then simply become the basis for further disagreement.
One must also conclude that, if the feelings
suspicion,

distrust

relationship,
as a means

led to the failure

of settling

same feelings
an agreement
gaining.

and hostility,

of integrative

contractual

language

issues, these
to reaching

issues via distributive

bar-

It would thus appear that a poor union-management

integrative

has a compounding
bargaining

method

the eLi ~'e:J:'il:;)'ut;i
V@
1;)ar~ainin.g;
for the settlement

~ame poor

of

negotiations,

effect.

a re already

as discussed

63

Le ss §.ID@fi@.bl@

ancl'thar

being felt.

in both the

1943 end 1946

Dunnette and Kirchner's con-

clusion that a major characteristic
Ol'1e

the

all issues are handled w~thin

framewllrk, Wh5_eh Ls

lends support to

at,!:,i,tudes
'tOw@.:J:"o.s

By eliminating

such issues and in which the effects of

relationship

The evidencBt

.'

of this

bargaining

must have also presented barriers
on the combined

relationship

the

characteristic

of

i'

of union-management

a f@@lin~

of

distrust

In fact, in this cass, it was primarily

SUSpJ_Clon.

63Dunnet te and Kirchner, .2.Q.

cat . , p. 56.

and

due
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to the degree

to which these attitudes

that the "aggression-resistance"

were exaggerated

type of relationship

developed.
The facts as discussed
to support Davis'

conclusions,

in this negotiation
regarding

also tends

management

bearing

the responsibility

for setting the tone of the union-manage-

ment relationship,

and what he termed as the "mirror

e1r r ect ,,6L
.,
j

As previously

or containment
1.

approach

bargaining

problems

or injustices;

threat

experience

status was not related to any internal

Its perception

of the union as an aggressor,

operation

A need for caution due to management's

perceived

and respect

attitudes

The union's

reaction

The union's

fo r- the union which

OPe

aggression

of aggression

and the bargaining

c i t . , p.

approach,

57.

a lack of

engendered

and hostility.

in turn acted to rein-

initial evaluation

to the management's

6Lf-D aVlS,
.

unit in turn, as pOinted

in this approach

of distrust,

force the management's

reaction

lack of

with union matters.

out by Mr. Maloney,

similar

a

of the plant; and

The union and the bargaining

recognition

resistance

was based on:

to the successful
3.

the management's

Its belief that the basis on which the union

obtained

2.

stated,

of the union.

unit's aggressive
as related by

72
Mr. Maloney,
conclusions
experience

also lends support to Beal and Wickersham's
concerning

with a company

.
65
ness to strlke".

affected

was Mr. Maloney's

major factors

and "it's

available

the union's

its willingto indicate

willingness

to

statement

that this was one of the
!' !'
oo
leading to the strike.

It would appear from statements
that Mr. Burns'

addition

free settlement

despite

Mr. Maloney

made by Mr. Maloney

in 1946 as the company's

tive on union affairs was probably

occurred.

of a union's

militancy,

The only evidence

that this relationship
strike

the relationship

conducive

representa-

to a strike-

the fact that a strike actually
confirmed

Mr. R. Brown's

statement

that Mr. Burns was a fairly rough, brusque type of individual,
but that, more importantly,
manner

which acknowledged

of the labor relations
in contrast
officials,
had focused

to previous

its existance

scene.

as an integral

Mr. Maloney

negotiations

the union leadership

part

also added that,

with other company

felt that this negotiation

on the issues rather than on time conQ'uml'n~
~
'='
power
It would thus appear that Mr. Burns'

play maneuvers.
presence

he dealt with the union in a

on the scene represented

of the existing

a turning

point in the tone

relationship.

In summarizing

f:r::

the events of this negotiations,

-.J)Bealand Wickersham,

66 Maloney

52E.

Intervie\tv,52E.

cit., p.

cit.

57.

it

..
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could be concluded
1.

The existence

the monetary
2.
approach

that the strike was a result of:
of a negative

range on

issues;
The parties'

inability to apply an integrative

to the contractual

in further

settlement

complicating

language issues which resulted

negotiations

over monetary

issues;

and
3.

The effect of a rather hostile union-management

relationship

in precluding

and its further
distributive
Burns

inhibiting

bargaining,

the use of integrative

bargaining

effect in settling the lssues via

despite the introduction

of Mr.

into the relationship.
1948 Contract

Negotiations*

As in 1946, the parties again had to suffer through
a strike before a settlement
complications
present

prevalent

was reached.

While many of the

in the 1946 negotiations

were still

to a lesser extent, others were not and other com-

plications

arose which brought

During

about a 26 day strike.

the two years following

the 1946 negotia-

the union-management relationship improved
considerably
tions,
in that the company finally accepted the union's existence.
This new degree
addition

of recognition

apparently

of Mr. Burns as the company's

*1948 negotiated

focused on the

industrial

relations

changes may be found in Appendix B.

'
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representative

and the way in which the union perceived

As Mr. Maloney

approach.

stated, while the union recognized

Mr. Burns as a hard bargainer,
recognition

the relationship

somewhere

it also saw in his approach

of the union and a willingness

In terms of Derber,
logies,

between

his

to discuss

Chalmers and Stagner's

a

issues.

typo-

at this time would seem to fall

what they term as "aggression

and resistance"

and "quiescence".
The relationship
and resistance",
influence

was characteristic

in that the union's

in the relationship
discussions

over problems

related to contractual

liness

of the "quiescence"
proved

revisions.

attitudes

and in the friend-

tone, the relationship

typology.

As previously

was more typical

implied,

view of each other's role in the relationship
primarily

In terms of

could only be traced to the partiesY

attitudes

by Mr. Burns.

Certainly

Davis'

conclusions

concerning

ment's

key role in establishing
evidence

extension

as supporting

the "mirror effect" and managea particular

of the parties'

in these negotiations,

of negotiations

changing

initiated

relationship.
changed attitudes

was the obvious fact that not only was integrative
used extensively

the im-

this change and the manner

in which it came about should be interpreted

As further

by

carried on in these negotiations

in the parties'

of the emotional

scope and depth of

was high a.swas indicated

the extensive

the improvement

of "aggression

bargaining

but resulted

in an

beyond an April 1 contract expiration
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date.

The union notified

it was interested
ment.

Between

formal

sessions

in amending

and modifying

the existing

that
agree-

that time and April 11, the parties had ten

only on proposed
meeting

31, 1948

the company on January

during which time the discussions
contractual

language

centered

revisions.

By the

of April 10, the wh oI.e contract had been reviewed

tentative

agreements

changes.

The fact that the parties were able to successfully

use the integrative

had been reached

and

bargaining

on many of the proposed

approach was further

evidenced

by the fact that the union's

final list of eleven demands

contained

item amenable

only one unsettled

to this bargaining

method.
The success

of integrative

bargaining

tion lends support to the applicability
integrative

bargaining

bargaining.

in this negotia-

of Walton

model to the process

and McKersie's

of collective

The fact that the parties were able to use this
II:
I"

approach

successfully

attitudes,

is also evidence

that somewhat
approach

positive

session

of Walton

attitudes

to be both possible
The meeting

another

under the conditions

,,'

of improved

and McKersie's

conclusions

have to be present for this

and effective.

on April 10 was significant

of integrative

bargaining,

beyond

just

in that this was

t.he f i.rst me e t.L rlg at which wages were discuc:sed'-- tlOleoeglnning
'
.
_C

•

-

of the "distributive

~

bargaining"

process.

Since, by the meet-

ing of April 10, the parties had almost exhausted
language

revisions

•.

the topic of

and the company vvas eager to VITap IIp a
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settlement,
wages.

it insisted

To the dismay

that the union make its proposal

of the company,

the union's

that a 30 cents per hour across the board
unsupported

by any specific

on

reply was

increase was needed

reference

to criteria

or justifi-

seemingly

"off-the-cuff"

cation.
Despite

the union's

posal on April 10, the company gave its proposal

23

on April

act amount
proposal

regarding

its position
1.

leaving

submitted

Along with this

the following

as a basis for

on the wage issue:
Since 1946 wage increases

had totaled

while the cost of living had increased

7

to the union

issues except for the ex-

of a cents per hour increase.

the company

or 35.Yfo,

all monetary

pro-

35.1 cents
only

cents per hour over and above the increased

27.8%,
cost

of living;
2.

Ta_xes
1916
1 oyees
- had decreas'eci~i[lCe
~~
+~ gl·'Jl·n~
I::, err·
~ lp

an additional

3.
industry,
Chicago

cents per hour in take-horne pay;

The company's
exceeded

wage rates were third high in the

only by companies

and Buffalo;

4.
wages,

3.33

located in Detroit,

and

There were seven other competitors

paying lower

some of which had settled union contracts

that same

year.
The company's
a.gain expressed
operating

concern with inflationary

in a public announcement

results:

pressures

was

of its 191+7 fiscal
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"High cost s of purchased material and parts
had substantially increased this element in
our unit cost. The company is still under
considerable pressure by labor to increase
wage rates unreasonably.
The combination
of these two situ~tion~ sets a pattern whic§7
may affect operatlons In the current year."
Of specific
pressures

concern to the company was the effect these

could have on hampering

recently

introduced,

completely

The company's

the market

redesigned

success of a

product.

final position for a settlement

given to the union on April 2$ for presentation
lng unit.

This proposal

proposals

and tentative

the most important
increase

included,
agreements,

change for the inclusion

in addition to the previous
a total of ten changes,

after October 1, 194$.

of a wage reopener

an absolute

parity

the first indication

(negative

The union's
company's

settlement

reply contained,

proposal,

on May 3 was

range) in the parties'
not only a rejection

positions.
of the

but also eleven new items covering vvage

as a basis for settlement.

eleven

items in this proposal,

1.

clause.

that there was a wide dis-

issues

contained

In ex-

clause, the com-

"No strike, no lockout"

The union's reply to this proposal
actually

to the bargain-

of which was a five cents per hour wage

with a wage reopener

pany demanded

was

Specifically

among the

the most important

issues were

in its demand for the following:
A wage increase

67Daily Dispatch,

of 15 cents per hour for hourly

May 22,

1949.

rated workers

and a 10 cents per hour increase for lncen-

tive employees;
Wage

2.
expiration

and
increases made retroactive

to Ap rl"1 1 ,the
J

_

date of the agreement.

The company,
wage demands

on May

4,

were unacceptable

informed the union that these
and the company's propo,sal

would be put into effect on May 3 so that negotiations
plant operations

occurred

to the company's reply

on May 10 when the strike officially began.
Considering

facts regarding
there

wa s

could continue until a final settlement

The union's response

reached.

and

the events as they transpired

the development

and the

of the parties' positions,

could be no doubt that the strike resulted from the

existence
butive

of a negative

bargaining

settlement

context.

range within a distri-

This conclusion

is readily

supported by the fact that:
1.
The parties' attitudes had significantly
as evidenced
2.
gaining

by the successful
The parties'

in uncluttering

as evidenced

use of integrative

successful

improved

bargaining;

use of integrative

the distributive

bargaining

bar-

process

by the fact that the parties had discussed

over
and

reached tentative agreement on several,
t;2 such issues,
./_
that only one of the union's final demands was amenable to
the integrative approach;
3.
After the meeting

of April 19 and right up to the

start of the strike, the parties were negotiating

strictly

on
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monetary

issues;

4.

The publicly

announced

settlement

referred

only

to the wage issue; and

5.

The disparity

between the final wage agreement

(9 cents per hour increase for incentive employees and 11
cents per hour for hourly rated employees)
positions,

especially

the company's,

and the parties'

right before the strike.

1949, 1950, 1952, 1955
Contract

Negotiations*

These four negotiations
because

of the manner

stances

surrounding

the manner

of contract

ne~otiations

the negotiations,

the most significant

of' a strike.

plexity

and seriousness

several

factors

most probable

similarity

in these
the

during these years, there were
settlement

the

outcome.

contribution

to identify

of relationships,

those factors which made

to these settlements,

again to Derber,

it is well to

of the parties'

Chalmers

relationship.

and Stagner's

typologies

one could see in this period a relationship

from that of "quiescence"

"repressed

for

While the issues varied in both com-

first review the development

evolving

and the reasons

present which made a timely

In attempting

Referring

the circ1.:UY!-

was the fact that all were settled without

C)

a major

settlement,

together

in which the contracts were settled.

Perhaps

occurrence

are considered

hostility"

by 1955.

in 19LI.8into one of almost

The relationship

at the time

SO
of the 1949, 1950 and 1952 negotiations
best identified

by one of "quiescence"

1955 negotiations

as bordering

could probably be
and that during the

on "repressed

hostility".

The main basis for this determination
tions in the parties'
and resolve
changing

attitudes

and their ability to discuss

several serious and complicated

balance

The most influential

relationship
position

continued,

inability to stabilize

bargaining

is based primarily

instability

(hereafter

In March,
referred

at the request
all toolro

om

certified
sentative.

bargaining

itself in outside

unit and the inability

order were as follows:

1949 the National

to as the N.L.R.B.)

employees.

unit to in-

These unstabilizing

Labor Relations

Board

held a consent election

of the I.A.M. for representation

the IaA.M.

This

company plants acquired during

and early Fifties.

in chronological
1.

manifested

to expand its original bargaining

clude other local unorganized

events

representative.

its influence waned which, in turn,

union raids on the D.E.F.E.'s

the late Forties

its

on the fact that as the union's

soured its attitude.
The union's instability

of the D.E.F.E.

strength was increas-

of these factors in shaping the

was the union's

as the employees'

conclusion

issues, and a

of power brought about by union instability

at a time when the company's bargaining
ing.

vilasthe altera-

rights covering

In August of that year, the N.LoR.B.

as the toolroom

employees'

chosen repre-

81
2.

In

May , 1952,

und er-way, the I.A.M.
separate

unit.

production

unit and place them in a separate craft

ruling in September,

skill in an identifiable

J.

In February,

1952

in this attempt, the

that there was not sufficient

craft to justify separation.

1954

the U.E.F.E.

fully through

an N.L.R.B.

the company's

newly acquired manufacturing

adjacent

city.
In April,

4.
Workers'

election

1955

the determination

the N.L.R.B.

and maintenance

1955.

On May

that the U.E.F.E.

chosen bargaining

other occurrences

In January,
acquired

1950,

one of
in an

a local of the United Automobile
for an election
bargaining

25, 1955

covering

unit.

This
expira-

the N.L.R.B.

made

remained the above em-

representative.

In addition to the aforementioned
several

facilities

was expedited due to the rapidly approaching

tion date of June 1,

ployees'

attempted unsuccess-

consent election to organize

Union petitioned

the entire production

were

employees and their helpers from the

The I.A.M. was not successful

N.L.R.B.

negotiations

filed a petition with the N.L.R.B.to

the maintenance

D.E.F.E.'s

1952

while the

difficulties,

made the union's position uncertain.

the XYZ Company announced that it had been

by a company located in the South and would continue

to operate as a division

of this parent company.

While

the

partie s , with whom intervielilTs
were held, did not comment on
the impact of this change, it could be assumed that it did
nothing

to enhance the union's perception

of its

01;\)'11

security.

r: ~~"";.---::-;-~:_-:_~:

=-:;:.
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The last element in the union's questionable
concerned

the problem

employees,

of securing members.

Several present

who were union stewards at various times during

this period,

when interviewed

new employees

infiltration

said that efforts to recruit

into the union were often unsuccessful

of the national

attention

because

the union was getting for communist

and domination.

While the early effect of this instability
union's

position

attitude

was minor, the cumulative

on the

effect of frustra-

tion by 1955 served to make the union somewhat dissatisfied
with the relationship.
parties'
period

attitudes

situations.

settling

that the

remained positive in the early part of this

is evidenced

several

The conclusion, however,

by their use of integrative
In November,

bargaining

1950, some six months

after

the 1950 contract, the parties were able to agree

on extending

this agreement

a cost-of-living

one year, to 1952, by agreeing

1952 negotiations,
the incentive
monetary

~

implications.
it was not the union's

that affected its attitude,

of this instability

lationship

revise

system and basic wage plan, which involved both

As already indicated,
~

In the

the parties were able to completely

and contract language

instability

on

clause which would increase wages one cent

for every 1.14 point increase in the cost of living.

effect

in

but rather the

on the union's influence

which precipitated

continuing

in the re-

the somewhat negative attitude.

The fact that the union's attitude was affected by its

83
dissatisfaction
the veracity
garding
weakened

with its depth of influence

of Derber,

this p01nt.
o

68

the union's

is evidence

Chalmers and Stagner's

of

conclusion

re-

The conclusion that this instability
influence and bargaining

position

1S

based on the obviously

weak internal support the union had to

rely on for bolstering

its position.

ployees

had suffered through

further weakened

strikes in

this position

want to further endanger

in a distributive
union's
affected
union's
position

1948

probably

value.

effect of the union's weakened

position

context was that it increased

the

of its own strike cost, which in turn

its goals and resistance
problems

and

its position by calling the employees

bargaining

perception

1946

in that the union would not

to strike over issues of questionable
The specific

The fact that the em-

were so apparent

points.

The fact that the

acted to further weaken

its

in that it could not be shielded from its opponents'
In terms of Walton

attention.
bargaining

model, the union's

and McKersie's

distributive

situation could be explained

thusly:
"The higher the union's strike cost, the lower
the union's estimate of the probability of
success.
. the higher the value the opponent
pla~es on his,stri~~ costs, the lower will be his

res].stance pOlnt."
From this Walton

and

McKersie conclude one of the

68 Derber, Chalmers and Stagner, ~.

parties'

cit., p. 37.

69 W~9.1tonand ]VIcKersi8,.£E. ~it., pp . 38 and 60.

main tactical

assignments

is "to manipulate

the strike costs

0
of the party and the opponent.,,7
In contrast to the union's position and also in further
detriment

to it, the company was making considerable

in its overall
almost tripled,
centage

Company sales from 1946 to 1955

operations.

while profits remained at about the same pec-

of groSS sales.

successful

progress

transition

Obviously the company had made a

from predominantly

work to the commercial,

industrial

government

contract

and school markets it had

been in prior to the war'. This degree of operational
plus the addition

of experienced

Burns in 1946 and Mr. Deud
company's
dicated,
degree

bargaining

in

industrial

1952,

acted to enhance the

Mr. Doud, unlike his predecessor,

of union distrust,

bringing

relations men, Mr.

While, as Mr.

capabilities.

weakened

in

settlement.

became

and the company's stronger could be seen

as an ideal situation

for discarding

Upon closer examination,
which inhibited

some

prevailed

This situation where the: union position
seriously

lV1a10n9Yin-

engendered

other circumstances

about a strike-free

success,

however,

the union altogether.

there were factors present

the company from taking full advantage

of its

First, the strikes of 1946 and 1948 and the losses

position.

they engendered
The extent

70

were still fresh in the mind of management.

of such losses was pointed out by Mr. R. Br-own in

r i.d
~.,

p.

60.

85
his public

announcement

of fiscal 1948 operating results:

"A strike of factory employees during the
first quarter contributed to an operating
loss of a~proximately $158,000 for that
period." (
Of equal importance
Forties

and early Fifties,

completely
success

was the fact that, during the late

redesigned

the company was introducing

products

to peacetime markets,

the

of which could have seriously been endangered

a work stoppage.

The third factor holding the company in

check was the fact that, basically,
relationship

by

the union-management

had improved to such an extent that the company

was more concerned

with improving

fines of a contract

operations within the con-

than with the possibility

of ousting the

union altogether.
The resulting

effect of the restrictions

on the parties was a positive
resistance

points.

by its problems

settlement

the company's goals were held

in check by the cost of a possible

demands

by previous

of adjusting

strike, the credibility

strike experience,

to changing market

elusion that the union's position
sUbstantiated

range between their

While the union's demands were restricted

of instability,

which was enhanced

operating

by the magnitude

71Daily Dispatch,

of the monetary

May 24, 1949.

and the

conditions.

was relatively

of

The con-

weaker is

settlement

in

86
1949 and 1950 relative
While
explained

19h9

the

and 1950 negotiations

by the above discussions

and the development
tributive

of the parties'

context, the settlement

of the 1952 and

were somewhat more unusual.

for a 15 cents per hour increase

countered

of the fundamental
rate structure.,,73
granting

involving
involved
creased

earnings
Because

so intertwined
recognized

"that any

The company's final proposal,
increase

increase

potential
contract

a new incentive

plan

changes, aLl of which

of 6 cents per hour and in-

under the incentive

language

in this proposal,

while only

of ii' cents per hour, involved

contract language

an additional

The

in the present wage plan and

in the wage structure,

extensive

employees.

should be used toward a correction

weaknesses

an immediate

a major revision

for incentive

this demand with a proposal

wage increases

with a demand

for hourly rated employees

and a 5 cents per hour increase

additional

attitudes

within a dis-

In 1952 the union entered negotiations

company

are adequately

of the parties' positions

bargaining

1955 negotiations

7?
-

to the earlier settlements.

and monetary

plan.
issues were

and because the union also

the need for vast improvements

in the company's

72Referring to Appendices C and D respectively, in
1949 a 5 cents per hour increase was given incentive employees, and a 7 cents per hour increas~ to hourly rated
employees.
In 1950 a 5 cents per hour lncrease was granted
to-all employees.
73The XYZ Company's proposal to the Wage Stabilization Board dated June 8, 1952.

~.
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total wage plan, the parties were able to apply mainly
tive bargaining
positive

techniques

settlement

while the relative
positions

mainly

of the parties'

to the degree

via integrative

negotiations,

effect

which

supported

ty" :

(1) slightly

challenges

a relationship

the perception

to the union's

increased

bordering

settlement

In addition

unsuccessfully

on "repressed

to its position;

It was because

relationship,

interest,

and (2)

and thus the
of this

that the probability

to the wage offer, the company's

over employees

rights, upon evidence
the union had sought

to organize in 1954, certainly

role in bringing

hostili-

could be seen as somewhat

offer to allow the union representation
of a majority

factors

union strength which resulted

the challenges

and the parties'

position

It was the com-

and the following

need to deal with him cautiously.

diminished.

arrived at

of Mr. Doud as somewhat antiunion

of a strike-free

and

noted, by the time of the 1955

of this hostility

from its withstanding

mutual

and external wage problems

a somewhat hostile attitude.

bined

hostility,

that it established

bargaining.

the external

had engendered

bargaining

it that led to a settlement

As previously

within a

range, it was the parties'

of major internal

to resolve

agreement

It could thus be concluded that,

strength

settlement

recognition
a desire

range.

was influential

a positive

in reaching

integra-

played a key

about the settlement.

For the union, this offer to expand its bargainin~
-=:J

·c)
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unit represented
greater

degree

rationale

an important
of stability

in making

the probability

opportunity

to bring about a

and thus strength.

The company's

such an offer was that there was always

that these employees would be organized

at

some time and, this being the case, one union representin~
eo

all local employees,

under one contract with one expiration

date, would be preferrable
different

contract

strike hazard.
a settlement

to getting an un kn own union with a

and expiration

The influence

of this offer in bringing

security

at times and to some degree,
of the represented

without

and/or self enhancement

take precedence

does

over the needs

strikes for the following

reasons:

on the parties ' positions

suIted in placing their goals and demands within

attitudes

about

of 1949, 1950, 1952 and 1955 were

of' restrictions

settlement

the

employees.

The contracts

effect

increasing

should be taken as evidence that the union's

needs for institutional

settled

date, thereby

range; and (2) the existence

(1) the

which rea positive

of somewhat

positive

during the early part of this period which made

integrative

bargaining

possible

during that time.

1957 Contract Negotiations*
During
1955 agreement,

the two year period after the signing of the
several

*See Appendix
changes.

changes transpired

G for a detailed

which were to have

list of negotiated

"

grave

on the 1957 contract negotiations.

effects

nine years of reletive

approximately

After

peaceful relatione,

nine day strike became necessary before an aglsement

a

could

be r-e ached .
In December1
the 1955 contract,

1955, six months after the
the local D.E.F.E. membership

chang"s its affiliation

U.E.F.E. 's national

to the

to agree to

affiliation to

by this national.

affiliation,

plus the influence

its bargaining

'cr'ibU'l~ec1 gr®tly

the bargaining

ing positions.

r't

several national

·W~~l s o
.~U5
a.i

unions,

of local autonomy

of winning the 1955 election
rights, and the influence

unit in the

-to srtJ:'(imgt;hening
~nit.

an anti-communist

This sW'i'tohin the local's national

whioh :ree.:rfirm~dits bargaining
expanding

voted to

that while the local union could

it chose the I.A.M. due to the greater degree
allowed

of

This move cam~co ab
.
.
OlXI~,

with the AF of L-CIO.

out by Mr. Maloney

have Iwitched it

I.A.M.

organization

Pledg:s and thus affiliate
painted

signing

1955

negotiations

'th~ UJ.1ionis position

This renewed strength

,

of

all conamong

flom the bargain-

The enhancement of the union's position during

these years brought about a change in the character of the
union-management

In
the

relationship.

review1

it will be remembered

1955 negotiations,

as almost
union's

at th® time of

the partiel' relationship

"repY'Bssed hostility"

position.

that7

Wi5

due to the weakness

typified
in the

As its position became more sOlidified,

one
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could see in the union's
in the relationship.
the union's

power.

had become strengthened

inhibitions

no longer hampered

It was, thus, this increased

negative
ferior

By the time of the 1957 negotiations,

position

that previous

approach a demand for a larger role

attitudes

position

engendered

to the point
its bargaining

strength,

the somewhat

by the frustrations

in the relationship,

large its role in this relationship,

and the desire to enthat made the relation-

ship at this time most typical

of a transitional

Derber,

typology.

Chalmers

authors'

and Stagner's

continuum

somewhere

between

of relationships,
"repressed

of an in-

phase ln

According

to these

this phase would be

hostility"

and "extensive

jOint

participation".
While the union was undergoing
company was doing likewise.
and redesigned

tion.

of market

conditions,

changes had to be made.

sales problem,
market,

Since the mid-Fifties,

products had become a way of life.

effort to stay abreast
as design

that of maintaining

new products
In an

technical

the company's

Just as took place after World War II, product

that the company's

standards.
incentive

as well
a

share of the

but it created another within the manufacturing

incentive

the

These changes alleviated

were being made faster than industrial
tablish

interna.l changes,

engineering

organiz0chan~es
.

D

could es-

The result of this situation

was

employees were spending a great

deal of time on work suited to incentive

standards.

The main issues that arose during these negotiations

91
were a result
attaining
larger

that is, the union's

a greater degree of stability and desire for a

role in the relationship

incentive

and the failure of the

system to provide opportunities

In addition
union

of the aforementioned;

to direct wage increases,

for higher earnings.

the union demanded

shop clause and a premium rate specifying

ings for incentive

employees

The union had attempted

its own instability.

work.

in past negotiations

but had been unsuccessful

Management

avoid such a provision.

average earn-

wh o , through no fault of t.he i.r-

own, were forced to perform on non-incentive

a union shop agreement,

a

to obtain

because

had been successfully

Management

was successful

of

able to

because

there was a sizable group of employees who were not members
of the union and who did not desire to become members,
because

the company was simply in a better bargaining

Hovvever, the union now considered
culmination

position.

the union shop a necessary

of its efforts toward complete and total recogni-

tion as a member
contrast

and

of the industrial

to previous

relations

environment.

In

years, the union perceived adequate

bargaining

unit support to obtain this demand.

Since it was

the union,

itself, that was bearing the brunt of its inferior

role, it could be assumed that this demand was primarily
institutional
sacrifice

one.

Thus, to the degree the union had to

other benefits

took precedence

an

in winning this issue, its

over those of the employees.

OWYl

need

Certainly

such

92
a conclusion
a union's

substantiates

74

other authorities

need for self-enchancement

times take precedence

or preservation

over the employees'

The union also had to vigorously
for premium

pay for incentive

due to the fact that:
incentive

had in fact suffered
lack of incentive

(1) a majority

needs.
support the demand

on non-incentive

work

of the employees were in

loss in earnings due to a

opportunity.
position

in opposing the demand for a

shop was for the most part based on principle.

management

will at

and (2) because these employees

a substantial

The company's
union

employees

job classifications,

findings that

did recognize

joining the union,

While

the fact that more employees had been

it also saw a group of employees who were

not joining and who, it felt, had a right to choose whether

or

not to become union members.
In responding
rate for incentive

to the union's demand for a premium

employees

on non-incentive

work, the company

could only recall the prime role such premium payments played
in the failure

of the old incentive

vised in 1952.
resulted

Under the old system, premium payments had

in incentive

employees

work under non-incentive
this negotiation
have provided

74 See

system that had to be re-

seeking every opportunity

conditions.

to

The union'S demand in

for an average earnings premium rate would

even a greater motivation

page 16.

than under the old
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system for these employees

to do exactly as before.

In terms of Walton

and McKersie's

distributive

bargain-

ing model,

there definitely

settlement

range in which the par-ti es could have reached agree-

ment.

The basis for this conclusion

tive agreements
increases

prior to a strike with the one exception
employees

in the earlier discussion,
manager

is the fact that tenta-

had been reached on other sizable monetary

pay for incentive

sisted

appeared to exist a positive

of the Division

on non-incentive

ful incentive

cost implications

as it was

effect on a success-

The issues which thus gave rise to the

strike were not of a monetary
the principles

As implied

at that time, this issue was not re-

long range undermining

program.

work.

and as related by Mr. Stevens, group

so much for its immediate

for its potential

of premium

nature, but WBre concerned with

of the premium pay and union shop issues.

One could well ask at t h is paint whether these issues
could have been resolved through integrative
if so, why weren't
by somewhat
ducive

hostile

bargaining

of non-incentive

of the parties.

First, for integrative

the issues have to be expressed

in

While the problem of large amounts

work could have been approached

the problem

con-

the issues involved also

to such bargaining.

problem.

and

characterized

would not be especially

bargaining,

to be possible,

terms of a mutual

While relationships

attitudes

to integrative

were not amenable

manner,

they.

bargaining,

in this

of union security was unique to only one

Second, the element of compromise which

lS

an

9h
inherent

characteristic

of the integrative

would not be compatible

with resolving

bargaining

disagreements

process
based

on principle.
While Robert Dubin's

'7 t:

union management

relations

in this thesis,

the reasons

integrative
predicted

bargaining

equality

just cited for the failure of

serve to support this theory.

of power.

of open dispute

to the point that

support to win its demands for

shop and premium rates for incentive

employees

the company made a major
logically

importance
logical

on

work.

Since the strike was of such a short duration

might

DUbin

In this case the union's position

had become strengthened

it felt it had the necessary

non-incentive

urldpr
~ ~
study

issues would be greater when there is a

in this negotiation

a union

) is not sDecifically
1-

in his theory that the probability

over fundamental
relative

theory of conflict and p0\;ITer
in

(but not complete)

explanation

this situation.

conceSSion,

assume it had failed to properly

of the union's demands.

7'
0

beforp
one

evaluate the

While this could be a

in some cases, it was not the answer in

As Mr. Stevens indicated,

the company knew

full well \11Th
at the major issues wer-e , but for reasons already
stated,

was not willing to concede to the dernarids •

the company's

strategy

included the possibility

In effect,

of taking a

75Robert Dubin, "A Theory of Conflict and Powc r in
Union-Management Relations", Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 1959-60.
76 See page 26.
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strike if neces,sary to support its position.
verbalized
involved
greater
union,

While not

as such, the strategy as depicted by Mr. Stevens

forcing the union to perceive its strike costs as
than the utilities

of obtaining its demands.

The

on the other hand, was trying to convince the company

of the same thing.

It could thus be concluded that the strike

was a result of each party's failure

to

convince

the

other

that the cost of a strike was greater than the utility of
sticking

to its position.

One could well ask at this point if the company's

position,
issues,

as one of "prinoiple"

7

on

these

then why were major concessions made afte], only

nine day strike?
from any logical
odd turn of

The explanation

Mr. Stevens?

for this move did not evolve

who played a key role in the

of the company's position, was out of the country

at the time the strike began.
at the parent

a

strategy, but was actually the result of an

events.

determination

In his absence,

company officials

company location gave the directive

the strike under the best possible
While this directive
initial

w~s so adamant

strategy,

terms as quickly as possible.

was not consistent

it resulted

to settle

with the company's

in the two issues being settled

and the strike concluded.
1959 Contract Negotiations*
Unlike the negotiations

*See Appendix

H

for Q

in 1957, the 1959 negotiations

detailed list of negotiated

changes.

were not burdened
of the premium
certainly

employees, while

in the relationship.

settlement.

had developed

typology

characteristics

typology

influence,

and (2)

the parties'

well into Derber, Chalmers and

of "moderate

joint participation".

of the relationship

particular

attitudes

were:

(1) a moderate degree of union

the presence

of generally

on the part of both parties.

favorable

Union influence

had increased due to the effect of its

several internal

changes in increasing

The conclusion
favorable,

six months

into separate

of the bargaining

by the company's
organizational

one organization

other for handling

unit support.

at this time, was based primarily
bargaining

on

to negotiate

unit in January,

prior to contract expiration.

precipitated

volved

bargaining

in

that the parties' attitudes were

their ability to apply integrative
the splitting

The

which warrant this

the relationship

generally

the

on the parties' ability to

By the time of the 1959 negotiations,

Stagner's

In addition,

Certainly the lack of such

influence

at a strike-free

relationship

results

agreement did not bring about any dramatic

issues had a positive
arrive

for incentive

under the old incentive system.

security

changes

pay question

The settlement

costly, did not produce the same disastrous

as occurred
union

with similar burning issues.

1959, some

This agreement

was

separating the XYZ Division
entities.

The separation

for defense contract business,

all commercial

and industrial

inand the

products.
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The basis for the above agreement was that, in exchange for splitting

the bargaining

as the new company organization,
the union as bargaining
company's

the company would recognize

representative

last unorganized

interest.

unit along the same lines

over employees at the

plant, upon a show of majority

While the parties' u.se of integrative

in reaching

this agreement

at that time, the benefits
this agreement
positive

was indicative

of positive attitudes

that accrued to both parties out of

would certainly

atmosphere

bargaining

indicate that at a minimum

a

was created for the ensuing negotiations.

While the parties' general attitudes towards each
other were positive,
obviously

there was one factor present which

strained the relationship.

II, Mr. Nichols,
become deeply

involved

in the union-management

over-reactions

in the union's
and settlements

side.

serious

relationship

and indecisiveness

had become a thorn

Issues got blown up out of proportion

(Mr. Nichols'

influence

It appeared that it

predecessor

and superior)

that kept this situation from reaching

proportions.
In discussing

parties'

had

During this time his

were unduly prolonged.

was only Mr. Doud's
stabilizing

in Chapter

who had joined the company in mid-1957,

by the time of this negotiation.
apparent

As indicated

this relationship

personalities

pOints to be made.
typological

approach

in establishing

Authorities

and the role of the
it, there are two major

in the field who dwell on a

tend to think that a particular

union-

management
various

relationship

progresses

The relationship

in these past negotiations,

progressing

between various

stages in

to this high level of "joint participation",

the gray areas between
dissimilar
Another

stages have distinct

from the adjacent

obvious conclusion

concerns

influencing

pattern as discussed

however, tends to indicate that,

either there is some vacillation

cussion

through

stages in finally reaching a plateau of complete

joint participation.

possibly

uninterrupted

self-confidence,
was certainly

evident

his reluctance,
a position.

to be drawn from this dispersonalities
Nichols'

in

lack of

by the ABC Consulting

in this relationship,

hesitancy,

Agency77

as evidenced

by

or inability to commit himself to

This shortcoming

among the bargaining

Mr.

pattern.

as indicated

characteristics,

stages.

the role of the parties'

a relationship

or

apparently

caused agitation

unit, which in turn, kept pressure

on the

union.

It could thus be concluded that a lack of self-con-

fidence

on the part of either parties' representatives

a relationship
getting

in that problems

strains

take an unduly long time in

settled.
While

the union-management

relationship.had

since the 1957 strike, the company's
shovving the effects

of a recession

The gross sales of the XYZ Division

773ee

page

49.

business

improved

by 1959 began

which had started in 1958.
declined

below those of
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1955 with profits also declining.
The only major issues to arise during this negotiation
concerned

monetary

on a substantial
program,

items.

The union's main demands

wage increase,

employees

these demands

was a result

local farm implement

on non-incentive
of unfavorable

position

suIt of forces pulling

The basis for

comparisons
plans.

On the one

had been poor due to a slight

acted to increase the company's resistance

On the other hand, there were the following

acting to lower this resistance
1.

with a

on the wage issues was the re-

in opposite directions.

hand, the fact that business
recession

work.

company's wage and benefit

The company's

point.

in the insurance

and, again, as in 1957, a demand for average earnings

for incentive

economic

improvements

centered

factors

point:

The need to maintain

wage scales competitive

in

the local labor market;
2.

The fact that management

had forecasted

1n the economy which offered the potential
and profits.

Management,

by the occurrence
3.

of increased

sales

in turn, did not want to endanger

this

of a strike, and;
increased

strength

to call a strike, as demonstrated

in 1957.

The union's

It is noteworthy
the manner

an upswing

that Torff's

and thus capability

conclusions

in wh i ch the parties establish

regarding

their positions

are

again borne out by the above data; that 1S, the parties select
the criteria

for establishing

positions

opportunistically,

and

.J
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that the criteria used may vary from one negotiation
another.

It should also be noted that the specific factors

used are somewhat different
negotiations.

than those used in the previous

The union, at this time, was not referring

the cost-of-living
of a recession

78

to justify an increase

tempering

in holding down the cost of living), while the

ing model,

it certainly

which resulted
a positive

be reached.
finally

eagerness

settlement

range in which an agreement

the substantial
considering

that a recession was in

over two years) it appeared that it was the company's
to avoid a strike that brought the parties' positions

within this settlement

importance

a positive

dropped

could

increase that was

range.

it appears that the follovving fact ors were
in the parties' reaching a strike-free

settlement in 1959:
1.
The effects of an improved relationship

parties

bargain-

from the influence of the above factors

(substantial

In summary,
of major

distributive

and that the wage increase alone amounted to approxi-

9%

together

and McKersie's

appeared that the parties' resistance

Considering

given

progress
mately

as a basis for

the union's demands.

In terms of Walton

formed

to

(due to the effects

company was using the effects of the recession

pOints,

to

atmosphere

for negotiations,

to focus their attention

78The

in creating

and in allowing the

on the issues rather than on

cost-of-living clause agreed to in 1950 was
as part of the 1952 contract settlement.

,
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unfruitful
2.
ideology

interactions

The fact that no issues of "principle"

or

in 1957 came up in the preceding two years to deter

an agreement;

3.
influenced
positive

such as power plays;

and

The conclusion
by previously

settlement

of a timely

that the parties' positions,

mentioned

as

factors, were within a

range thus increasing the probability

settlement.

'~

CONCLUSIONS
While the field of Industrial Relations
oelng recognized

I

.

as an area worthy

been accomplished
knowledge

of the dynamics

the industrial

ing process.

special study, much has

in the last forty years in furthering
of this field.

great deal of the research
within

0f

was late in

field - the collective

out In the Introduction,

by testing

dynamics

severa.l of the more reknown theories

of collective
Specifically,

identify
come

settlement.

conclusions
separate

that is, a strike or timely
special attention

models, and Derber, Chalmers

of relationships

on collective

negotiations

and

and the effects of these

bargaining.

were drawn resulted

contract

of the out-

Wa.lton and lVIcKersie'
s "distributive"

bargaining

continuum

relationships

which are determinative

bargaining;

was given to validating

Stagner's

of the

an attempt was made in this study to

In pursuit of this objective,

and "integrative"

of this

bargaining.

those variables

of collective

bargain-

the purpose

of this study was to further the present understanding
process

a

has focused on one primary process

relations

As pointed

Specifically,

The data from which

from an analysis

of some nine

at one company over a 17 year

period.
102
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As a result of this study, it is fair to conclude
that Walton
bargaining

and McKersie's

models are reliable

the collective

terms

bargaining

of reference
of "goals"

as theoretical

process.

corresponding

and "resistance

these points were determined
contrasting

constructs

of

Within the distributive

to Walton
pOints".

and McKersie's
As Torff had found,

by the parties'

selective use of

criteria which varied from one negotiation

another.

Torff's

selection

of various

negative

and integrative

ocess the parties were shown to have two major

bargaining
points

distributive

conclusion

settlement

that the parties'

criteria

increasing

to

opportunistic

the probability

of a

range was probably most amply illustrated

in the 1946 and 1949 negotiations.
Once the parties had settled on their positions,
negotiating

sessions

these positions.
borrowed

expected utility"

ing this negotiating
tions utilized

of chances to alter

As stated in Chapter I, Walton and McKersie

the terms of "utility",

"subjective

process.

"subjective

from decision

probability"

expected

theory in explain-

Because the contract negotia-

the data necessary
utilities

to examine this process

as Walton and McKersie

theorized

were not available.
Walton
collective

and

in this study occurred as many as 26 years prior

to this writing,
altering

served the function

the

and McKersie's

bargaining

theory that the parties to

settle issues outside a distributive

context was also validated

in this study.

It was shown,

of
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especially

in the 1945 negotiation,

conditions

the parties were able to settle issues within an

integrative
important

context.

The one condition that appeared most

for integrative

relationship

consisting

Without

these attributes

ditions

depicted

be effective,

that under certain

bargaining

to be effective was a

of mutual trust and positive attitudes.
in the relationship,

as necessary

the other con-

for integrative

bargaining

namely a free flow of information,

and a supportive

to

motivation,

climate, appeared to be stifled.

The one area, outside of economic issues, where integratj.ve bargaining
issues

involving

of integrative
demonstrated
occurred

"principles"

bargaining

over the parties'

issues is apparently

The failure

for settling such issues was
where a work stoppage

inability to settle the issues of

and premium pay for incentive

for the failure

possibility

or "ideologies".

in the 1957 negotiation

union security
reason

does not appear to be feasible is on

of integrative

employees.

bargaining

The

on such

due to the extreme difficulty

or im-

of the parties to view the issue as a common

problem.
As a part of this study, Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's
continuum

of relationships

depicting

the manner

ships develop
bargaining

in which collective bargaining

and for its implications

process.

III, several

was reviewed for its validity

in

relation-

for the collective

As a result of the analysis in Chapter

conclusions

appear justified.

The continuum

of
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relationships

as developed

by these authors does not appear

to be reflective

of the manner in which a collective bargain-

ing relationship

develops.

suggested,

As the authors, themselves,

their data was apparently

biased by the fact that

all the relationships

in their study were analyzed at a specific

point in time instead

of over a lengthy time interval.

Specifically,

in the relationship

a stage of "repressed
stage of "moderate

hostility"

under study, it appeared that
and "hostility"

joint participation"

preceded the

instead of following

it.
Due to the inconsistency
Derber,

of this data with that of

et aI, this author concludes that in a continuum

relationship

patterns,

Joint participation
hostility

each significant

stage of increased

is quite possibly preceeded by repressed

and then hostility.

This conclusion

the fact that levels of joint participation
mision

of one of the parties

take unilateral
historically

action.

is prompted by

involve some re-

(generally management)

been conceived

this hesitancy

to the uncertainties
position

of by management

as an "inherent;
The initial

is probably repressed hostility

(both legal:and

in overcoming

ability to

This ability to initiate action has

right" which it has obviol1.s1ynot given up easily.
reaction_to

of

strategic)

due

of the union's

this block.

The second major point that came out of this review of
relationship
lationship
ing methods

patterns was that the tone of the parties' re-

appeared

to be a determinant

available

to the parties.

of alternative

bargain-

As was pointed out in
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the 1946 negotiations,
hostility,

suspicion

ing methods

and distrust limits alternative

in that true integrative

a poor relationship
a distributive

to the conflict-free

by
bargain-

is not

bargaining

context.

conclusions

settlement

all issues

regarding

factors important

of contract negotiations

came out of this study were as follows:
1.

between

Rees' conclusion

the business

to develop

that there is a relationship

cycle and the tendency for the parties

incompatible

expectations

was validated by the

of the 1948 negotiations;

outcome

2.

A relationship

the union's militancy
Wickersham

of hostility

and willingness

quite possibly affects

to strike as Beal and

concluded;

J.

As other authorities

the union's
servation
needs;

bargaining

forces the parties to negotiate

Other relevant

which

characterized

prlnclp~es,
Thus, a,s in the case of issues l"n"volvl"flg"
"l

possible.

within

a relationship

institutional

in the field have concluded,

needs for self-enhancement

does at times take precedence

and pre-

over the employees'

and

4.

The personalities

of the negotiators,

have more of an indirect affect on negotiations
resulting

relationship

As mentioned
other factors

themselves,

through the

than a direct affect.

in Chapter III, certainly there are

that were not reviewed in this study which come

to bear upon the collective

bargaining

process.

Research

in

•
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the area of perception
two fields having
because
consider

and communication

implications

the data available

process.

It was only

in this study was not adequate

to

such factors that they were excluded.
As a result

interesting

sequel

of using the methodology

Such a study would allow a detailed

of the applicability

bargaining,

an arithematical

and "resistance
perception

in this study, an

would involve studying several negotiations

as they are in process.
analysis

on this

would obviously be

points",

of decision
analysis

theory to collective

of the parties'

"goals"

and some insights into the role of

and communications.

APPENDIX A

1946 Negotiated

I.

Changes

Wages

A.

In the first year incentive workers'

was increased

18.5 cents per hour, which would

total increase
incentive
basic

of approximately

workers'

increase.

efficiency

base rate

generate a

22 cents per hour when the

would also be computed on this

For those employees

on hourly rated jobs, a

18.5 per hour increase was simply added to each individual's
hourly

rate.
In the second year a 15 cents per hour increase

B.
was granted

to

both incentive and hQurly

ever this increase
computed
ployees

was not included

separately
this would

additional

rated employees.

How-

in the base rates, but

for all hours worked.

For incentive

1pJaS

em-

simply mean that they would not generate

earninga by multiplying

their incentive

efficiency

by a higher base rate.
C.

employees

second

was changed for third shift

from 5 cents per hour to 7 cents per

shift premium
D.

merit

The shift premium

remained

A paragraph

increases

within

the same at

5

hOU1~

while the

cents per hour.

was added in this contract to make
the established

108

rate ranges a function

109
but with another provision ~rtch aDow

of management,

the

union to grieve on such increases.
E. The "piece rate plan" was updated and several nevI]
paragraph.

were added to the contract in way of explanation

and improvements for the employees.
1. Incentive employeeS were guaranteed that an
estGblished

rate would allow them to perform at a minimum of

120 per cent.
2.

Incentive

employeeS were guaranteed

120 per

cont of their base rate when assigned to specified types of
day work.

3.

A premium rate for hours worked on assign-

ments where incentive

4.
arrangements

standards were not available.

Contract

language was added to cover pay

for incentive

to an hourly

employees temporarily

transferred

classification.
A paragraph was added to protect incentive

5.

rates from being changed without specific changes in job
content.

6.

the grievance
II.

Incentive

procedure

rates were also made subject to

in this contract.

Hours of Work and Overtime
A. A paragraph waG added d"fin~ng

a work week in term.

of its beginning and end.
B. Contract language was added to provide rest periods
of ten minutes

in tho morning and ten minutes in the afternoon.

110
C.

The following
1.

Language

changes were made in overtime pay:
added to provide double time for over

ten hours in one day instead

of time and one-half for all hours

over eight as in the 1943 contract.
2.

Contract

language added to pay time and one-

half for all work on Saturday
contract

provision

as such in lieu of the 1943

which only provided time and one-half for

over 40 hours per week.

3.
recognized

Double time was added for all work done on

holidays

and Sundays

in lieu of the 1943 provision

wh i ch called for time and one-half.

4.

The paragraph

stipulating

tion for incentive

employees

pay would be based

on the total earnings

by the total hours worked.
that overtime
actual
III.

overtime

computa-

was changed to state that their
in the week divided

This language replaced the statement

pay for incentive

employees

would be based on

earned rates.
Non-discrimination
A.

Contract

language

was added to prohibit discrimina-

tion on the basis of race, sex, and creed.
IV.

Leaves

A.

of Absence
The one year limit on leaves of absence established

in the 1943 contract
V.

for union business

was dropped.

Seniority

A.

The probationary

period for new employees was

changed from three months to two months.

111

B.

The amount of time on layoff without loss of

seniority was changed from 24 to 12 months.
The concept of the departmental

C.

was left unchanged,

but the

seniority system

ocedure for bumping under such

a system was spelled out in detail in this corrtract.
VI.

Temporary Transfers
A. The company added language making it management's

right to transfer employees where needed.

B.
temporary
VII.

The union added language defining when such a
transfer becomes a permanent transfer.

Discharge
A. A paragraph was added requiring the company to

notify the chief steward the same day an employee was discharged.
VIII.

Grievance Procedure
A. A sentence was added to the introductory paragraph

to provide that any grievande settlement made directly between
the employee and management
B.

would be non-precedent

setting.

Language in the first step of the grievance pro-

cedure was changed to provide that the grievance be put in
writing at the conclusion of thi- .tep jf

it were not settled.

The 19l+3 contract provided for the vvriting of a grievance in
its second step.
C. The time limits and the
grievance
D.

ocedure for handling the

in the third step was spelled out in more detail.
Contract language was added to state that the cost

112
of arbitration
IX.

Union Business

A.

per

would be borne equally by both parties.

The 1946 contract increased the one hour allowance

vI/eel\: for'

grievance
hours

on Company Time

uni on comma tt.eemen to the follovving allowances:

committee

-- 2 hours per

week; chief steward

per week; shop stewards -- 2 hours per week.

5

.~
I

APPENDIX B
1945 Negotiated

I.

Changes

Wages
A.

incentive
granted

A 9 cent per hour wage increase was granted to
workers and an 11 cents per hour increase was

to employees

on hourly rated jobs.

The shift premiums were increased from 5 cents

B.
per hour to

7 cents

per hour for second shift employees

the third shift premium was increased from

7

and

cents per hour

to 10 cents per hour.
II.

Vacations
A. The vacation

employees
III.

schedule was improved by giving

with 15 years or more seniority 3 weeks vacation.

Seniority
A. A system of classification

seniority was esta-

blished.
B.

The layoff procedure

was formalized

tract as to the order in which employees bump.
recognized

C.

the neW system of classification
A paragraph

in the conThis procedure

seniority.

was added in the layoff and recall

section to the effect that employees refusing recall within
90 days into a job in the sam. labor grade would loose hi"
113

'II

Ilh
seniority.

D.
employees

Contract

language was dropped on giving laid off

a one year extension of their seniority after being

laid off for a specified period of time.

IV.

Transfers

A.
dr~pped
employee

er one day vVct:3

The permanent transfer language

BDd in its place language

wac iDserted allowtng the

to refuse a transfer beyond the first day if work

was available
B.

Grievance

A.

in his regular job classification.

Contract

how temporary

V.

and Promotions

language vIas added spe cifying eXclctly

transfers were to be paid.
Procedure

ocedure was

The second step of the grievance

changed to allow the partie. 4B hour" instead of 24 hours to
reach a settlement

before processing the grievance on to the

next step.

B.
provide
laneuagB
hours) .

The third step in the procedure was altered to

for the appropriate
which

meeting within 72 hours instead of

called for a meeting

(preferably

within 48

APPENDIX C
1949 Negotiated Changes

I.

Wages

A.
incentive

A 5 cents per hour wage increase was granted to
employees

The 5 cents per hour increase granted to

rated employees.
incentive

and a 7 cents per hour increase to hourly

employees

was not to be included in their base rates

upon which incentive
B.

The language

changed to require

C.

earnings

could be generated.

on the merit increase system was

a minimum

The language

increase of 5 cents per hour.

on the procedure to question incen-

tive rates was formalized

and went from a three step to a six

step procedure.

D.

The

which incentive

general

within

of non-incentive

employees would be paid at a special

rate were increased
E.

categories

work for
pr-smi.um

from 7 to 19·

Two new job classifications

were added and slotted

the grade structure.
F.

The upper limit on one rate range was increased by

4 cents per hour.
II.

Hours of Work and Overtime

A.

Contract

upon union agreement

language was added to allow the company
to schedule special work weeks.
1-L5
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_
A note was added to the over i:;lYne
.
-I anguage

B.

lng for special arrangements
III.

allow-

on overtime equalization.

Holidays
A.

For the first time qualifications

the contract for determining

B.
retired

Probationary

employees,

vacation,

eligibility

employees,

and employees

pay eligibility.

IV.

Language Changes

A.

B.
delineation

C.

of federal and state law.
The toolroom

employees were excluded from the

of the bargaining
Language

unit.

was added to require that union stewards
they could not be probationary

employees.

Prior language allowing for strikes and lockouts

after an exhaustion
strikes

on

intent to have the contract coincide with

must have seniority,

D.

employees

A paragraph was added to the preamble stating that

it was the parties'
requirements

on layoff,

on a leave of absence were all ex-

eluded from holiday
Miscellaneous

for holiday pay.

employees

employees terminated,

were added to

of remedies was changed to prohibit

and lockouts

for any reason duri.ng the term of the

contract.

E.
was altered

The language

specifying

to make it less formal.

dues and initiation

the checkoff procedure
Also the amount of union

fees was discontinued

as a part of the

contract.

F.
union

The company agreed in this contract to furnish the

one bulletin

board for its exclusive use.

APPENDIX D
1950 Negotiated Changes
I.

Wages

A.

A

both incentive

5

cents per hour wage increase was granted to

and hourly rated employees.

per hour increase

Again the 5 cents

was not included in the incentive employees'

base rate.

B.

In November

1950

of

the parties further agreed to

a cost-of-li ving alLowaric e which provided for a 1 cent adjustment for every 1.14 point rise in the cost-of-living
C.

Language

in whi.ch incentive
defective
II.

was added to clearly specify the manner

employees

would be paid when wcr-k i ng on

work.

Holidays
A.

Holiday pay for Ln cent ive employeesvvas

by approximately
difference
special
III.

index.

20 cents per hour.

between

premium

incentive

increased

This increase was the

employees'

base rate and the

rate paid for non-incentive

work.

Vacations
A.

the average

The calculation

of vacation

earning rate for incentive

rate for hourly

employees

pay was changed from
employees and the base

to a percentage
117

of annual earnings.

118
The percentages

agreed upon increased

for all employees
vacation

exce

vacation pay by

those eligible for only one week

and their increase amounted to
B.

requiring

The vacation
a minimum

eligibility

1%.

rules were changed by

of 125 days attendance

vacation

year and the term "employee"

vacation

purposes.

C.

The language

.8%

during the

vIas defined f'or-

regarding the scheduling

of vaca-

tions VJas revised to allow employees to schedule vacations
anytime during

the year as long as it fit production

IV.

Transfers

Temporary

A.
application

Contract

schedules.

language was clarified on incentive rate

for employees

temporarily

transferred

to another

job.

V.

Grievance

A.

Procedure

The language

cedure was clarified

covering the first step of the pro-

as to the time limits and the manner of

processing.
B.

The third step language was clarified as to the

state of a grievance

prior to going to arbitration.

APPENDIX E
1952 Negotiated Changes

I.

Wages

A. A general wage increase of 4 cents per hour
This increase did not re-

was granted to all employees.
quire Wage Stabilization

Board approval and was considered

apart from the proposal to the Wage Stabilization Board.

B. As a result of
Wage stabiHzatiOn

obtaining the approval of the

Board the following

changes were made

in the wage plan:
1. The incentive plan was changed from a "piece
Rate Plan" to a "Standard Hour Plan".
2. The rate range and merit increase system was
changed

1;0

a "One Rate Plan"

rated employees.

both incentive and hourly

for

This change involved fre •• ing former in-

creases which were paid as a bonus on top of hourly eamiDgs
and the earnings generated by the cost-of-living
jnto the Dew base rates.

increases

These increases amounted in total

to 40 cents por hour for incentive employ.". and 42 C"uts
per hour for hourly rated Imploy •• S,
brought about

by the

change to

8

The total increase

one rat. plan

in addition

to the 4 cents per bOur increase preViouslY mentioned'fil'
119

120
10 cents per hour.

c.
as

'The "Standard

approved

following

by the Wage Stabilization

Board also involved the

changes:
1.

special

Hour Plan" and the "One Rate Plan"

premium

Incentive

employees would no longer be paid a

rate for non-incentive

work, but would be

paid at the new base rates.
2.
set to generate

It was agreed

that incentive

rates would be

125% instead of 120% called for under the old

plan.

3.

Incentive

employees would no longer be paid
, but would be paid

urn rate for- hoL l" day
t. h e s pe c i"a 1 or-em.i
1·
at their new base rate.

This change would actually amount to

a 6 cents per hour increase

4.

for these employees.

The elimination

of all the provisions

under

the old contract which set forth the various types of nonincentive
special

work for which employees would be paid at the

premium
5.

studied

rate.
It was agreed that all rates were to be re-

for the purpose

potential

of establishing

and for the purpose

the 125% earning

of setting realistic

standards

in lieu of the loose ones which had been established

under

the old system.

6.
ployees

It was also agreed that wh en incenti ve em-

were temporarily

transferred

to other classifications,

they would be paid at their base rate, the base rate of the

121
job to which t he y were transferred,
generated
II.

or - e lncentive
t.he ri

earnings

on this job, which ever was highest.

Hours of Work

A.

The shift hours were spelled out in the contract.

B.

The fact that half hour lunch periods were pro-

vided was also spelled out in the contract.
III.

Seniority

A.

The classification

by requiring
gaining
IV.

three months time in one classification

seniority

Grievance

A.
procedure

Procedure

A paragraph

was inserted in the third step of the

which allowed the company to enter the fact that

Leaves

A.
while

before

in that classification.

there was a question
V.

seniority system was refined

of contract interpretation.

of Absence
Language

restricting

an employee from working

on a leave of absence wa,s eliminated

B.

from the contract.

A one year limit was placed on leaves of absence

except for employees

on lmion blJsiness and then it was pro-

vided that they would not accumulate

seniority beyond one

year.
VI.

MiscellaneouS

A.
materials

B.

Language

Language

was inserted limiting the type of

union officials
Contract

Changes

could post on their bulletin boards.

language was added which stated the com-

pany would post all vacant jobs before hiring a new employee.

APPENDIX F

1955 Negotiated

I.

Changes

Wages

A.

A 10 cents per hour wage increase was granted to
in the first year and a 5 cents per hour wage

all employees
increase

was granted to all employees in the second year.
A 3 cents increase was granted to the existing

B.
premium

for second shift employees which made the shift

premium

for both second and third shifts 10 cents per hour.

II.

Vacations

A.

Vacation

eligibility

requirements

were changed

from 125 working to 150 working days.

B.

The three days vacation plus the applicable

for employees

pay

with less than one year of seniority was

eliminated.

C.

Employees

with 10 to 15 years of service and who

had two weeks of vacation
of annual earnings

D.

for vacation

Employees

three weeks vacation
annual

earnings

coming were given an additional

1%

pay.

with 15 years seniority and entitled to
were alsO given an additional

for vacation

pay.
122

1% of

123
III.

Holidays
One additional holiday was added bringing the

A.

total to 7·

B.
Christmas
IV.

Seniority
A. Language was added making probationary time not
in a 12 month period.

Leaves of Absence
A. The freeze after one year on the accumulation of

seniority
VI.

were added for the

and New Year holidays.

cumulative
V.

Special qualifications

for employees on union business leave was eliminated.

Miscellaneous

A.
crimination

B.

Language Changes

Paragraphs

dealing with company and union dis-

on the basis of union membership was deleted.
The basis for the number of stewards was changed

to coincide with the number of specified departments.
C.

The language under the incentive system was

altered to make it the responsibility

of the chief union

steward to ask for removal of incentive rates put in question.
D.

Language was added to give shift preference to

senior employees.
E. The language specifying the bumping procedure was
simplified

and allowed for both a classification

seniority

system and then plantwide seniority.
F.
Language was modified to give the company one day
to notify the chief steward of any discharge in lieu of the old
reauirement

of notification

on the same day.

APPENDIX G
1957 Negotiated

I.

Wages
A.

A 10 cents per hour wage increase was granted to

all employees
increase

ployees

questions

to all employees in the second year.

cents per hour increase was granted to emrated classifications.

An arbitration

was added as a final resort on

of pay rates or new Or changed jobs.

C.

Three job classifications

were upgraded.

Insurance

A.
insurance
premiwn

A major medical
program

Incentive

incentive
amounted

provision was added to the life

with employees

paying a percentage

of the

cost.

A.

Plan

A new provision
employees

was added wh i ch would result in

being paid a special rate (this rate

to 14 cents above base rate) for three general

categories
IV.

g

in hourly

B.

II.

in the first year and a 7 cents per hour wage

was granted

An additional

III.

Cahnges

of non-incentive

work.

Holidays

A.
probationary

The holiday

qualifications

employees

pay for holidays

were changed to grant
falling within their

l25
probationary

V.

period

Hours

once they had completed

probation.

of Work

A.

Language

v-lasadded to allow the company to change

the shift hours as specified

in the contract

with union agree-

ment.
VI.

Grievance
A.

Procedure

The language

was changed to provide
the chief steward

in the second step of the procedure

that the parties

and personnel

involved would include

supervisor

instead

of the

plant superintendent.
VII.

Miscellaneous

A.

Language

The language

ing unit was altered

Changes

specifying

the extent of the bargain-

to include two additional

plants and one

li'Jarehouse.

B.

The checkoff

to provide for automatic
C.
maintenance
D.

provision
renewal

A new provision
of membership
The language

in the contract was altered

of checkoff

was added which

from year to year.
called for a

agreement.
governing

the number of union ste'vvards

was changed to allow one steward for each foreman and assistant
foreman

rather than One steward per department.
E.

be equalized
F.

Language

was added to provide

among full time
Language

that overtime

was to

oyees.

was added to specify a morning and after-

noon rest period.
G.

The company agreed to pay five dollars for the

price of prescription

safety glasses.

APPENDIX

H

1959 Negotiated Changes
I.

Wages
A.

A wage increase

to all employees
increase
II.

in the first year and an 8 cents per hour

was granted

to all employees

The eligibility

requirements

changed back to the 125 working
B.

Employees

the third week
C.
vacations

for vacation benefits

day requirement.

with 10 years seniority

were granted

of vacation.

The contract

language

covering the timing of

WEts cl_lteredto allow the company to ehut.

ing the summer months
III.

in the second year.

Vacations

A.
were

of' 15 cents per hour v\fasgranted

for the purpose

d own dur-

of vacations.

Insurance

A.
insurance

The following

changes were made in the company's

ogram:
1.

Life insurance

2.

Accidental

was increased

from $1,000 to

~t3,000.
death insurance

was also increased

from $1,000 to $3,000.

3.
increased

The weekly sickness and accident benefit was

by $10 per week for a total of $50.

l
12'7
IV.

Seniority

A.

A clause was added which disallowed

employees,

wh o had never been in the bargaining

accumulate

seniority

B.
seniority
V.

unit, to

subsequent to June 1, 1959.

Several minor references

to the old departmental

system were deleted from the contract.

Miscellaneous

A.

salary

Contract Changes

The recognition

provision in the contract was

changed to show the split off of the defense products plants
into a separate bargaining

unit.

1
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